Abstract
At the end of his extensive survey of empirical studies on the relationship between people‘s sentiments and acts, Deutscher concludes that forty years of positivist research has not been able to produce consistent insights. He suggests that a “phenomenological perspective” might be more rewarding: “If I can come to see the world as [the man in the street] does, then I can come to understand the relationship between his talk and his action as he does.“1 Characteristic for the phenomenologist, according to Deutscher, is that he “seeks to understand the social world from the point of view of the actors in it.”2 This idea of phenomenological sociology is not uncommon. It is also defended by Phillipson and his collegues in New Directions in Sociological Theory, as appears from the statement that “the intentionalist style, recommended by phenomenological sociology, gives primacy to the modes of attention the actor gives to his world, takes the problem of meaning as its starting point, and understands action in terms of man‘s meaningful projects.“3 And of course many other authors propose similar standpoints.
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References
I. Deutscher, What We Say/What We Do (Glenview, 1973), p. 330.
Ibid., p. 335.
P. Filmer, New Directions in Sociological Theory (London, 1973), p. 89.
D. T. Campbell, ‘Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Dispositions’ in Psychology: A Study of Science, vol. 6, ed. S. Koch (1964), pp. 159–62.
Phillipson, in Filmer, p. 149.
H. P. Gallacher, ‘On the Meaning of “Adequacy” in the Sociology of Alfred Schutz’ this volume, pp. 91–97.
A. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (London, 1967), pp. 62–63.
Published under the title ‘The Problem of Rationality in the Social World’ Economica 10(1943): 130–49; also in Collected Papers, 2:64–90.
Probably also written in 1940, since it is mentioned in a letter of Schutz to Parsons dated 15 November 1940 (cf. R. Grathoff, ed., The Theory of Social Action [London 1978], p. 4).
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (1953); also in Collected Papers, 1:3–47.
‘Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Science’ Journal of Philosophy 51 (1954); also in Collected Papers, 1:48–66.
Cf. D. Phillips, ‘Some Issues and Problems in the Study of Social Action’ Sociale Wetenschappen 16 (1973): 103–26; G. de Vries, Sociale Orde, Regels en de Sociologie (Meppel, 1979), p. 78.
Cf. D. Phillips, ‘Some Issues and Problems in the Study of Social Action’ So dale Wetenschappen 16 (1973): 103–26; G. de Vries, Sociale Orde, Regels en de Sociologie (Meppel, 1979), p. 78.
Collected Papers, 1:52.
The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 99.
In Grathoff, p. 84.
De Vries, p. 62.
Collected Papers, 1:67, 211.
In Grathoff, p. 40.
Hereafter cited in the text as PL
I thank Dr. O. Gruengard for suggesting to me both the Oedipus and the check example.
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Gallacher, H.P. (1983). Schutz’s Thesis and the Moral Basis for Humanistic Sociology. In: Tymieniecka, AT., Schrag, C.O. (eds) Foundations of Morality, Human Rights, and the Human Sciences. Analecta Husserliana, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6975-9_25
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