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Personal identity and the concept of a person

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Philosophy of Mind/Philosophie de l’esprit

Part of the book series: Contemporary philosophy/La philosophie contemporaine ((COPH,volume 4))

Abstract

Philosophers approach the concept of a person from two directions. In ethics and political philosophy it often is taken as primitive, or at least familiar and not requiring elucidation, but persistent inquiry and difficult problems make a deeper look inevitable. In discussing abortion, for example, one can hardly invoke principles about rights and welfare of persons concerned, without facing the question about which concerned parties are, in fact, persons, and what that means. One moves remorselessly from issues of rights and responsibilities to questions of consciousness, self-awareness, and identity - from the moral to the metaphysical.

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© 1983 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers The Hague/Boston/London

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Perry, J. (1983). Personal identity and the concept of a person. In: Fløistad, G. (eds) Philosophy of Mind/Philosophie de l’esprit. Contemporary philosophy/La philosophie contemporaine, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6932-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6932-2_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-3300-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6932-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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