Abstract
No other problem seems to be more central to philosophy of science than the problem of reduction. Whether a proposition, a theory, or a whole branch of science, may be reduced to another proposition, theory or discipline, is a typically metascientific question.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
R. Carnap: 1938, Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science, Int. Enc. Unified Science I, 1. Reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds.): 1948, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York, pp. 408–423.
E. Nagel: 1961, The Structure of Science, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp. 339–341. Nagel is relying on previous work from 1949. The distinction between homogeneous and inhomogeneous reduction is also made
L. Sklar: 1968, ‘Types of Inter-Theoretic Reduction’, Brit. J. Phil. Science 18, 109–124, p.110.
K. Friedman: 1982, ‘Is Inter- theoretic Reduction Feasible?’ Brit. J. Phil. Science 33, 17–40, p. 20.
The concept of approximate explanation was hinted at, but not worked out, in C. G. Hempel: 1965, Aspects of Scientific Explanation. The Free Press, New York, p. 344. See also
E. Scheibe: 1973, ‘The Approximative Explanation and the Development of Physics’, in P. Suppes et al. (eds.), Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science IV, North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 931–942.
R. M. Yoshida: 1977, Reduction in the Physical Sciences, Dalhousie University Press, Halifax.
T. Nickles: 1973, ‘Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction’ J. Phil. 70, 181–201. Nickles also uses awkward indices: reduction-], reduction2« Making the same distinction, Wim- satt calls them “explanatory” reduction and “successional” (or “intra-level”) reduction. See
W.C. Wimsatt: 1976, ‘Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account’, in R.S. Cohen et al. (eds.): 1976, PSA 1974, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 671–710.
5.Sklar2 p. 112.
T.S. Kuhn: 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
P.K. Feyerabend: 1962, ‘Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism’, in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.): 1962, Scientific Explanation, Space and Time, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 28–97.
K.R. Popper: 1974, ‘Scientific Reduction and the Essential Incompleteness of All Science’, in F.J. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology, Reduction and Related Problems, Macmillan, London, pp. 259–284.
According to Kuhn, Feyerabend and even Popper, the relevant cases of reduction in factual science are cases of displacement. A similar point is made by M. Spector: 1978, Concepts of Reduction in Physical Science, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, and refuted in R. Yoshida: 1981, ‘Reduction as Replacement’, Brit. J. Phil. Science 32, 400–410.
L. Darden and N. Maull: 1977, ‘Interfield theories’, Phil. Science 44, 43–64.
More attempts at classifying different concepts of reduction are made in K.F. Schaffner: 1967, ‘Approaches to Reduction’, Phil.Science 34, 137–147.
M. Born: 1949, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, Clarendon Press, Oxford, and Dover, New York 1964, pp. 129–134, even claims that Newton’s law of gravitation may be “derived” or “deduced” from Kepler’s laws, not only vice versa.For a comparative account of those concepts of unity of science see G. Vollmer: 1984, ‘The Unity of Science in an Evolutionary Perspective1, Proc. 12th Conf. on the Unity of the Sciences (Chicago, Nov. 1983), Int. Cultural Foundation Press, Mew York (in press).
That the minimality of a description cannot be proven in every case, is stressed in G.J. Chaitin: 1975, ‘Randomness and Mathematical Proof’, Sci. American 232, May 1975, 47–52.
11.See also G. Vollmer: 1977, ‘Theoriendynamik und Ablosung einer Theorie durch eine neue (bessere): Simulation statt Erklarung’, in G. Patzig, E. Scheibe and W. Wieland (eds.), Logik, Ethik, Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften (XI. Dt. Kongreft fur Philosophie, 1975), Meiner, Hamburg, pp. 493- 499.
S. Hawking: 1980, Is the End in Sight for Theoretical Physics? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
See, e.g., R.L. Causey: 1976, ‘Unified Theories and Unified Science’, in R.S. Cohen et al. (eds.), PSA 1974, Reidel, Dordrecht. - P. Kitcher: 1981, ‘Explanatory Unification’, Phil. Science 48, 507–531.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Vollmer, G. (1984). Reduction and Evolution — Arguments and Examples. In: Balzer, W., Pearce, D.A., Schmidt, HJ. (eds) Reduction in Science. Synthese Library, vol 175. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6454-9_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6454-9_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6456-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6454-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive