Abstract
The main purpose of this article is to question the soundness of a recent attack on legal positivism launched by Professor Ronald M. Dworkin in his essay “Is law a system of rules?”1 I do not think any preliminary explanation of the strategy of my argument is necessary except for my use of a model taken from the rules of a game. I am aware of the important differences existing between legal norms and rules of games. But in spite of these differences law, as a normative structure, shares some problematic features with other normative structures, those of games included, and the following non-legal model does, I think, throw light on some of the main issues discussed later.
This article presents certain ideas to be elaborated in a book new in preparation. I wish to acknowledge the generous assistance of the Guggenheim Foundation for the grant of a fellowship which enabled me to pursue these studies at Oxford during the academic year 1968–69. Published in Buenos Aires, by G. R. Carrió, 1971.
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References
Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, ch. II ( New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964 ).
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© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Carrió, G.R. (1984). Legal Principles and Legal Positivism. In: Garcia, J.J.E., Rabossi, E., Villanueva, E., Dascal, M. (eds) Philosophical Analysis in Latin America. Synthese Library, vol 172. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6375-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6375-7_4
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