Abstract
It is characteristic of Husserlian phenomenology1 that it methodically retracts from the direct description of the given object back to the reflective description of the acts of consciousness that give constitution to the object. In a sense, what is hidden in the immediate intuition of the object is brought to light by the intentio obliqua of reflective intuition or of the transcendental reduction. There is a basic duality here, the duality of transcendence and immanence, of world and subject, a duality replicated within transcendental consciousness by the distinction of noema and noesis. Leaving aside very significant philosophical differences, I dare say that, topologically speaking (that is, considering only the position of the concepts in the overall system of the theory), this duality corresponds to the traditional opposition of the represented and the representation, the object and its image.2 What is hidden in the object and is brought to light by the examination of the image as such is the structure of the image and the formal constitution of the object — insofar as the object is given to the subject, that is, as phenomenon. By structure, in a wide Structuralist sense, I mean the system of rules that determine the formation of the image and the set of components articulated by these rules.
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Notes
This paper is the text of the introductory remarks I presented for the discussion of my book Fictive Discourse and the Structures of Literature: A Phenomenological Approach (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981) at the seminar of the World Phenomenology Institute in March 1982 in Boston.
I have touched on this theme in my article ‘Representation and Fiction,’ Dispositio, 1980.
See, for example, Ideas, bk. 1, sec. 43.
Precisely because a nonfictional memoir is taken as the discourse of the real author, he can project an image of himself that is better than life. He can feign noble convictions and pretend fine gestures. The real author of a fiction does not have this possibility, except in passages where he breaks the fictional tenor.
See John Searle, ‘The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,’ New Literary History, 1975, and my critical remarks, ‘The Act of Writing Fiction,’ New Literary History, 1980.
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Martínez-Bonati, F. (1984). Fiction and the Transposition of Presence. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) The Existential Coordinates of the Human Condition: Poetic — Epic — Tragic. Analecta Husserliana, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6315-3_36
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