Abstract
Faraday was perhaps the ideal candidate for introducing a new world-view. He was a great experimentalist, but he was also strongly inclined towards what he called “speculation.” His experiments were crucial in his attempt to understand the nature of electric and magnetic actions, but his dissatisfaction with the action-at-a-distance conception of these actions (Ampère et al.) did not stem simply from his experimental observations. Faraday engaged in a great deal of metaphysical speculation, both as a result of his experiments and as a guide to experimentation. Experimentation and speculation, together, constituted his research.1 It must be stressed, though, that he took great care to separate what his experimental data could support from what was speculation, since he was somewhat wary of speculation.2 While acknowledging its value, he maintained a cautious attitude towards it, which made him hesitant to express his speculations publicly. However, his hesitations diminished some as he gained more confidence in them and developed them more fully. Thus, it is difficult to say what his new conception was, in its entirety, and when he first had it.3
The online version of the original chapter can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6187-6_13
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
For an interesting discussion of scientific problems and their relationship to metaphysical beliefs, see Agassi (1975a).
See, e.g., Faraday (1831), 2429, 2430. (Unless preceded by ‘p’ all references to the Researches are given by paragraph number.)
It should be noted that there is a fundamental disagreement in the literature as to when Faraday ‘had’ his field concept (see Agassi (1971), Berkson (1974), Gooding (1980b, 1981), and Williams (1964, 1975)). It seems to me that the real source of the disagreement is the lack of an account of what it means to ‘have’ a concept. My own position is that ‘having’ a concept is a matter of degree, in which case most of the dispute dissolves.
Faraday (1821a).
Bence-Jones(1870), 1, p. 355.
Agassi (1971), Berkson (1974), Gooding (1980b), Heimann (1971), Levere (1968), Spencer (1967), Williams (1964).
Portions of these lectures are published in Bence-Jones (1870). The manuscripts for Faraday’s chemical lectures are at the Society for Electrical Engineers in London.
Levere (1968).
“A speculation touching electric conduction and the nature of matter,” (1844), in Faraday (1831), 2, pp. 284–293.
Bence-Jones(1870), 1, p. 213.
Op cit., note 10.
My position is in disagreement with Agassi (1971) and Berkson (1974) who argue that Faraday worked out this conception, fully, at the time of his discovery of electromagnetic induction. I also disagree with Gooding (1978, 1981) who argues that Faraday came to this position only in the final period of research, in connection with his study of magnetic induction. Williams (1964) is unclear as to when Faraday had it. My own position, which will be argued for here, is that significant elements of the conception were present in his early research, e.g., the possibility of a new description of the actions and the importance of the lines. Most of the conception coalesced in his research into electrostatic induction, in particular, his speculations concerning the nature of particles and the unity of forces. The ‘final’ conception came with his research into magnetic induction, which is the period in which he attempted to clarify his views and in which he allowed himself to be more openly speculative.
“On some new electro-magnetical motions, and on the theory of magnetism,” (1821), in Faraday (1831), 2, pp. 127–151.
Bence-Jones (1870), 1, p. 356.
Reproduced in Williams (1964), p. 181.
Faraday (1831), 60.
Ibid., 70.
Ibid., 217.
Faraday (1831), 220.
Faraday (1832), January 21 or 22, 1823.
Faraday (1831), 238.
Ibid., 524.
Ibid., 1164, 1165.
Ibid., 1320, 1368–69. The clearest picture is presented in his 1846 “Thoughts on ray-vibrations,” in (1831), 3, pp. 447–452. See also Gooding’s interesting discussion of this (1980b).
Faraday (1831), 1658.
“A letter to Prof. Faraday, on certain theoretical opinions.” R. Hare in Faraday (1831), 2, pp. 251–261; Berkson (1974), Gooding (1978), Levere (1968), Spencer (1967).
Faraday (1831), 1615, 1616, 1665.
Op cit., note 29.
Faraday (1831), 2, p. 262.
Ibid., p. 267.
Ibid., 1231.
Faraday, himself, did feel that electrical brush discharge indicates the prior existence of the lines of force. Ibid., 1449.
Ibid., 1326. See also 1320.
For a detailed analysis see Gooding (1980b). See also Agassi (1971), p. 36 and Williams (1964), p. 181.
See Faraday (1831), 1362–1370.
Ibid., 1658.
Op cit., note 27.
Gooding (1978).
Op cit., note 10.
Ibid., p. 294. Further support for this move is provided by the fact that Faraday did not see any inconsistency in his reply to Hare. Given this conception of particles there is no inconsistency.
Bence-Jones(1870), p. 177.
Faraday attributed his position to Boscovich, but, as we have discussed, there are important differences. For detailed discussions see Spencer (1967) and Williams (1964).
See “Thoughts…,” op cit., note 27 and “On the conservation of force” (1857) in Faraday (1859).
Faraday (1831), 2146, 2221.
Ibid., p. 2 footnote.
Ibid., 2429, 2430.
Ibid., 2797.
Ibid., 3074.
Ibid., 3175.
Faraday (1831), 3, pp. 407–437.
Ibid., 3258.
Ibid., 3246.
Ibid., 3251.
Ibid., 3269.
Ibid., 3254.
Ibid., 3258.
Ibid., 3263.
Ibid., 3277.
Ibid., 3278.
November 29, 1839 to R. Phillips in Williams et al. (1971), p. 211.
Faraday (1831), 3, p. 528.
Ibid., 3302.
He argued, e.g., in his “Conservation of Forces,” that the “[m]athematical mind has no advantage in perceiving new principles of action.” Op cit., note 46.
See, e.g., what Faraday has to say about the light aether at the beginning of Faraday (1831), 3.
Ibid., 3, p. 443. He also speculates in his “Thoughts…” that the aether is nothing more than forces; but he did not commit himself to this view, so neither can we.
Ibid., 3, 3244.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1984 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Nersessian, N.J. (1984). Faraday’s ‘lines of force’. In: Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific Theories. Science and Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6187-6_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6187-6_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-0950-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6187-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive