Abstract
The network view of meaning has its origins in the objection Duhem raised to the standard account’s conception of the relationship between a theory and empirical evidence; in particular, to its failure to take into account the pragmatic element in the construction of theories.6 In the previous chapter we saw that the key to the conceptual-theoretical distinction is the notion that there is a difference in kind between the acceptance or abandonment of conceptual principles, which is pragmatic in nature, and the verification or refutation of empirical hypotheses, which is factual in nature. Thus, the conceptual-theoretical distinction is based upon what Quine has called the ‘pragmatic-factual’ distinction. We will turn to Quine’s arguments shortly, since for our purposes they are more important given that his focus is on meaning while Duhem’s is on verification and refutation. But first, I will give a concise formulation of Duhem’s argument because it did strongly influence Quine in his formulation of the network view.
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Notes
Duhem (1962), esp. pp. 184–7.
Quine (1973), p. 38.
Quine (1969), p. 89.
Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1962).
For a more detailed discussion of this attempt, see my (1979).
Quine (1969), p. 89.
Nersessian(1979).
Feyerabend (1956b), p. 242 and (1965a), p. 203.
Feyerabend (1962), p. 36 and (1965a), pp. 118–212.
For a detailed discussion, see Shapere (1966).
There is a third ‘response’, i.e., the ‘non-statement’ view of theories of Sneed (1971) and Stegmüller (1975 and 1976). Sneed did not develop his conception as a response to the incommensurability problem; it was Stegmüller who saw it as providing a way around the problem. They are more concerned with analyzing structural relations than with meaning. Their treatment of semantics is not incompatible with my approach — we are concerned with different levels. Their conception does not account for the developmental aspect of meaning, which is my major concern.
Scheffler (1967).
Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1973, 1975).
Some of this analysis is based on an unpublished paper written with H. Philipse.
M. Fehér argues, in an unpublished paper “Meaning variance and scientific realism,” that there is a serious problem of unwarranted ontological assumptions with all versions of the causal theory.
Putnam (1979), p. 233.
See Shapere (1982a). I agree with his argument, in principle, although I would argue that his ‘paradox’ arises because of an overemphasis on the synchronic aspect of the causal theory.
Ibid.
There have been a few recent analyses along the lines I propose. See, e.g., Shapere’s analysis of the notion of observation (1982b).
Shapere (1981), p. 1.
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© 1984 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Nersessian, N.J. (1984). ‘Meaning variance’ and ‘incommensurability’. In: Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific Theories. Science and Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6187-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6187-6_3
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