Kantian Universalizability and the Objectivity of Moral Judgments

Abstract

In the Grundlegung zur Methaphysik der Sitten, Kant derives five conclusions that are among the fundamental fixtures of his moral philosophy. Kant concludes that (1) there is but one “supreme principle of morality”. In the penultimate paragraph of the Preface Kant states that “[t]he sole aim of the present groundwork is to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality ’(Kant’s italics). Kant believes that we can understand more easily what that principle is, if we consider it under three different formulations, which, he thinks, are equivalent for two reasons. The first reason is that each formulation selects the same actions as being either morally obligatory, morally forbidden, or morally permitted, in complete agreement with the sound natural understanding of man. he second reason is that each for-mulation emphasizes an essential aspect of morality that is conceptually distinguishable, but inseparable from the other two. The first of these aspects is that the moral worth of an action depends entirely upon whether or not reason can sanction everybody’s doing it. This is the aspect of universality. The second aspect is that rational nature is an absolute end. The third is that autonomous agent-legislators are peers. In the process of understanding each one of these aspects, we come to understand the others and see their necessary interconnections. We also see that all three are grounded upon the same foundations.