Plantinga on Foreknowledge and freedom

  • Philip L. Quinn
Part of the Profiles book series (PROF, volume 5)


In God. Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga undertakes to refute some arguments intended to prove that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are logically inconsistent. The bulk of Plantinga’s discussion is an attempt to show the unsoundness of an argument constructed by Nelson Pike to establish the inconsistency of a certain version of the doctrine of divine foreknowledge with the claim that some human actions are voluntary. In the first section of this paper, I shall outline Pike’s argument; in the second section. I shall present a detailed exposition of Plantinga’s criticism of it.


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  1. Hoffman. J.: 1979. ‘Pike on Possible Worlds. Divine Foreknowledge, and Human Freedom’, The Philosophical Review 88, 433–442.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Pike, N.: 1965, ‘Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action’, The Philosophical Review 74, 27–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Pike, N.: 1977, ‘Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom and Possible Worlds’, The Philosophical Review 86, 209–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Plantinga, A.: 1974. God, Freedom, and Evil, Harper & Row, New York.Google Scholar
  5. Rowe, W.: 1978, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction. Dickenson. Encino.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip L. Quinn

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