On the Roots of Reference: Quine, Piaget, and Husserl

Abstract

In the ever-growing literature on Quine, his Paul Carus lectures, “The Roots of Reference,” appear to have attracted much less attention than they deserve.¹ And yet in these lectures, apart from continuing some of the main theses (about language and reference) of Word and Object, Quine develops some new strategies which are of the utmost philosophical interest and whose significance goes far beyond the behavioristic framework that pervades them. It is not my purpose to add to the already available criticisms of that framework, particularly in connection with the question of language learning. I would rather follow two methodological principles. One, formulated by Quine himself in his reply to Chomsky, is: “The more absurd the doctrine attributed to some one, ceteris paribus, the less the likelihood that we have well construed his words.”² I would therefore look beneath the absurdities of a behavioristic framework for elements of philosophical insight, which, to be sure, are never lacking in Quine’s writings.

Originally appeared in Swoyer and Shahan (Eds.), The Philosophy of W.V.O. Quine (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), pp. 21–43. Reprinted with permission.