Abstract
The aim of an inquiry is to find out the truth. Nevertheless, it seems that the substitution of one false theory for another, in the course of an inquiry, may consitute progress. Can the truth be the aim of an inquiry and yet a false theory realise that particular aim better than some other false theory? In order to answer this question affirmatively it is necessary to give a precise and acceptable account of what it takes for one proposition to be closer to the truth (be more truthlike, or have greater verisimilitude) than another.
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References
Popper [1963], pp. 401–2.
Popper [1972], p. 58.
ibid.,?. 59.
Tarski [1956], p. 152.
Miller [1976], pp. 378–80.
ibid., p. 380.
Miller [1977b], p. 83.
Popper quotes this in a similar context; see Popper [1972], p. 60.
Niiniluoto [1982], p. 290.
See Popper [1976], Miller [1976] and Niiniluoto [1978b].
This example appears in Oddie [1981], p. 245. It might be noted here that all the theories in example A can be adequately expressed in a first-order monadic language with identity.
ibid., p. 242. The theories in example B can be stated in a first-order language with identity, two two-place predicates, and one individual constant, interpreted over a fixed infinite domain.
See Tichy [1976], p. 27, and Popper [1972], pp. 55–6.
David Miller has written extensively on this adequacy condition. See, for example, his [ 1976 ].
Many simple examples, such as those in this section, have been put forward to decide between rival theories of truthlikeness. However, the correct judgements on these examples are not always transparently obvious. In other words, they are not all clear-cut examples. Over some of these examples there is no widespread agreement. For example, Miller [1976] and Niiniluoto [1979a] both endorse some low-level judgements which are repudiated in Oddie [1981]. Niiniluoto repudiates the judgement made above on example A, for reasons which are examined and rejected in section 4.3. In general, examples are included here only if there should be little or no dispute about the correct judgement on them, although it will be obvious that some of the disputed examples, like A, have become part of the debate, and so must be included in the discussion.
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Oddie, G. (1986). Truth and Closeness to Truth. In: Likeness to Truth. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4658-3_1
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