Abstract
Sometimes, instead of saying that a certain person ought to do a certain thing, we may say that a certain state of affairs ought to be, or ought to occur. For example, someone who is annoyed by loud motorcycles might say that there ought to be a law against such things. Someone who thinks government is getting corrupt might say that there should be more honesty in government. Someone who feels that the present distribution of wealth is unjust might say that there ought to be a more equal distribution of wealth in the world. Each of these could very well be a statement of the ought-to-be.
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Notes to Chapter 8
This approach is based on things said by Jaakko Hintikka in ‘Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic,’ in Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings ed. by Risto Hilpinen (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970), pp. 59–104.
Hintikka’s approach is criticized in R. L. Purtill, ‘Deontically Perfect Worlds and Prima Facie Obligations,’ Philosophy 3 (1973), 429–438.
David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), Chapter 5.
Alan McMichael, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing: A Problem in Deontic Logic,’ Analysis 38 (1978), 83–84.
Lewis replied to McMichael’s criticism in ‘Reply to McMichael,’ Analysis 38 (1978), 85–86.
An extremely interesting discussion can be found in Terence Horgan’s ‘“Could”, Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy XVII (1979), 345–358.
For a good discussion of this temptation, see Terence Horgan, ‘Counterfactuals and Newcomb’s Problem,’ The Journal of Philosophy LXXVIII (1981), 331–356.
See also David Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,’ Noûs XIII (1979), 455–476.
Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘The Ethics of Requirement,’ American Philosophical Quarterly I (1964), 147–153.
Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘The Ethics of Requirement,’ American Philosophical Quarterly I (1964), Ibid., p. 150.
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Feldman, F. (1986). What Ought to be. In: Doing the Best We Can. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8_8
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