Abstract
Many moral thinkers have accepted the notion that there is an important connection between moral obligation and group welfare. More specifically, they have thought that the welfare of a social group would more-or-less automatically be maximized if all the members of that group were to do their moral obligations.1 We can say that any doctrine to this effect is a version of the “principle of moral harmony” (PMH).
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Notes to Chapter 7
Among the many advocates of this view are: George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in Mary W. Calkins, ed., Berkeley: Selections (New York: Scribner’s, 1929), pp. 427–469;
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in E. A. Burtt, ed., The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill (New York: Modern Library, 1949), p. 796
Stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950)
Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, abridged edition (New York: Random House, 1965).
See, for example, Gerald Barnes, ‘Utilitarianisms,’ Ethics LXXXII (October, 1971), 56–64 and
Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980).
Used by Gerald Barnes in ‘Utilitarianisms,’ Ethics LXXXII, 1 (October, 1971), 56–64.
Used by me in ‘The Principle of Moral Harmony,’ The Journal of Philosophy LXXVII, 3 (March, 1980), 171–174.
Used by Donald Regan in Utilitarianism and Cooperation, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980).
See also Allan Gibbard, ‘Rule Utilitarianism: Merely an Illusory Alternative?,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1965), 211–220.
Jordan Howard Sobel has written extensively on questions concerning individual obligations and group welfare. See, for example: “Everyone”, Consequences, and Generalization Arguments,’ Inquiry 10 (1967), 373–404;
‘Utilitarianism: Simple and General,’ Inquiry 13 (1970), 394– 449;
‘The Need for Coercion,’ Coercion: Nomos XIV, edited by J. R. Pennock and John W. Chapman, (Chicago/New York: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1972), 148–177;
‘Interaction Problems for Utility Maximizers,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy IV, 4 (June, 1975), 677–688;
‘Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas,’ Dialogue, (1976); ‘Everyone’s Conforming to a Rule,’ Philosophical Studies 48 (1985), 375–387.
There is a large body of literature on group action. Bibliographies can be found in David Copp, ‘Collective Actions and Secondary Actions,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), 177–186;
and Michael McKinsey, ‘Obligations to the Starving, Noûs XV (1981), 309–323.
Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980). In subsequent footnotes, I refer to this book as ‘Regan’.
Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, p. 124
Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, pp. 135–136.
Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, pp. 109–123.
Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, pp. 177–178.
Noûs XVIII, 1 (March, 1984), 152–159.
For Regan’s comment on this sort of objection, see Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, pp. 172–174.
Pointed out by Barley, op. cit., p. 157, as well as by Earl Conee in his review which appeared in The Journal of Philosophy LXXX, 7 (July, 1983), 415–424.
Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, p. 177.
Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, pp. 177–185.
This point is made by Conee, op. cit., p. 421.
For Regan’s definition, see Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, p. 6.
See Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) Regan, pp. 18–19.
The reader is invited to compare this argument with Regan’s argument on pp. 18–19.
A similar view is suggested by Conee, op. cit., p. 422.
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Feldman, F. (1986). Individual Obligation and Group Welfare. In: Doing the Best We Can. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8_7
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