Epistemic Coherentism: “Circles” of Justification

Abstract

Epistemic coherentism provides a solution to the regress problem that is most popular among contemporary philosophers. But talk of the coherence theory of justification can be misleading. For ‘coherentism’ is actually an imprecise catchword referring to several very different theories of justification. Yet these different coherence theories do have at least one feature in common: the denial that justification requires foundations. By clarifying this metaphorical talk of foundations, we can get at the heart, or at least at one of the hearts, of epistemic coherentism. For present purposes we may regard a foundation of justification as a belief that is justified independently of any justificatory relations to other beliefs and somehow supports other justified beliefs that are not foundations. Coherentism excludes such foundations by affirming that all justified beliefs are justified in virtue of their relations to other beliefs. Thus, on the coherentist solution to the regress problem no evidence chains terminate in immediately justified, foundational beliefs. In a sense, all justification is inferential.