The Problem of Epistemology [1936]

  • Ludwik Fleck
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 87)


The fundamental error in many discussions from the field of epistemology is the (more or less open) manipulation of the symbolic epistemological subject, known as ‘human spirit’, ‘human mind’, ‘research worker’ or simply ‘man’ (‘John’, ’Socrates’), which has no concrete living position, which does not basically undergo changes even in the course of centuries and which represents every ‘normal’ man regardless of the surroundings and the epoch. Thus it is to be absolute, unchanging and general.


General Education Social Force Technical Term Figurative Meaning Natural Heat 
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Note and References

  1. 1.
    Emerson: Representatives of Mankind (translated by Kreczowska), pp. 114–115.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    J&#00F3;zef Rostafiński (ed.), Cracow, 1893.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Fleck: ‘Jak powstał odczyn Bordet-Wassermanna?’ (How Did the Bordet-Wassermann Reaction Arise?), Pol. Gaz. Lekarska (1934); Fleck: Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache,-Basel, 1935.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    PrzeglądFilozoficzny (1935).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    These difficulties cannot be unravelled even by many-valued logic alone (-Łukasiewicz, Post, Zawirski) or by probability logic (Reichenbach), as logical calculation is only possible in relation to uniformly clear (understandable) sentences, and not when, inter alia, sentences with an unclear content and non-comparable notions are involved, i.e., sentences expressed in a foreign style or in a style which is precisely that of the period of faster development.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ludwik Fleck

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