Fleck’s Contribution to Epistemology

  • Patrick A. Heelan
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 87)


Ludwik Fleck situated himself epistemologically in opposition to the two most prominant schools of the philosophy of science of his time: the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Schlick and others of the Vienna Circle, and the Historicism of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Jerusalem and the sociologists of knowledge (46-51)1. A brief statement of where he stood with respect to each is helpful.


Natural Science Scientific Revolution Perceptual Object Scientific Fact Scientific Observation 
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© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1986

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  • Patrick A. Heelan

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