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Dubious Doubts

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Facts and Values

Part of the book series: Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ((MNPL,volume 19))

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Abstract

Many arguments for moral scepticism are bad. It is maintained that moral arguments are not deductive, and that only deductive arguments are valid, so that moral arguments cannot be valid. Or it is maintained that only facts can be true, and moral judgements are not judgements of fact, so that moral judgements cannot be true. Or it is maintained that only what can in principle be verified by sense experience can be meaningful, and moral judgements are not verified by sense experience, so that moral judgements cannot be meaningful. Or it is maintained that only what has empirical content can be cognitive, that is to say capable of being known, and questions of right and wrong do not have empirical content, and so no knowledge of right and wrong is possible. Or it is maintained that moral standards vary from place to place and from time to time, and therefore have no objective validity and are simply functions of the societies that uphold them. Or it is said that moral values, if they existed, would be queer sorts of entity, and that therefore moral values do not exist, and moral statements cannot be objectively true or false.

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Notes

  1. For a fuller treatment see J.R. Lucas, On not worshipping facts, Philosophical Quarterly 8, 1958, pp. 144–156.

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  2. J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing right and wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.

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Authors

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M. C. Doeser J. N. Kraay

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© 1986 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands

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Lucas, J.R. (1986). Dubious Doubts. In: Doeser, M.C., Kraay, J.N. (eds) Facts and Values. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, vol 19. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4454-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4454-1_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8482-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4454-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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