Ends and the good will

Abstract

Kant opens the main body of the Groundwork with this well-known assertion: “It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, that can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will” (Gr. 393). This striking pronouncement actually consists of two claims: a good will is good without qualification or limitation (gut ohne Einschrdnkung), and it is the only thing imaginable that is good without qualification. Consequently, if there are any other goods, or any other good things (and Kant seems to admit that there are), then those other goods will be good only with qualification: they will be conditioned goods. In Kant’s judgment, then, a good will is not just superior to or better than other goods — as if it were simply the superb good on a single scale of goods. Kant maintains rather that a good will belongs to a distinct class of goods, namely, the class of unconditioned goods, and that it is the only member of that class. A good will is, so to speak, sui generis (one of a kind).