Abstract
The Problem of solution theory of cooperative n-person games with side payments is either : how to divide a common product or : how to allocate a common cost among n active players. In fact both problems may be combined into one (Straffin and Heaney, 1981). Various answers have been given to this question. For a survey of solution theories see Shubik (1982).
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Schleicher, H. (1988). A Fair Division Process in a Cooperative N-Person Context Where Side Payments Are Allowed. In: Munier, B.R., Shakun, M.F. (eds) Compromise, Negotiation and Group Decision. Theory and Decision Library, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4021-5_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4021-5_9
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