Abstract
By Chance I mean physical probability as opposed to degree of belief. Good subjectivists do not believe in Chance, but this does not free them from the obligation to give a theory of chance. Ordinary and scientific discourse is full of chance talk, and if its function is not to be given straightforward naive analysis in terms of reference to real chances, then a more sophisticated analysis is in order. Subjective Bayesians have a pragmatic story to tell which is, by now, well known. Putative beliefs about chance are given a reading in terms of ordinary beliefs about the world. The sort of pragmatic analysis of meaning offered is of general philosophical interest, and invites close study by the philosophical community.
This paper further develops ideas presented in Chapter 5 of my Pragmatics and Empiricism. I am indebted to Robert Stalnaker for forcing me to face the problem of partiality. This research was partially supported by NSF grant SES-8605122.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Adams, E. (1965), “On the Logic of Conditionals”, Inquiry 8, 166–197.
Adams, E. (1966) “Probability and the Logic of Conditionals”, in Aspects of Inductive Logic, eds. J. Hintikka and P. Suppes (North-Holland: Amsterdam), pp. 265–316.
Adams, E. (1970), “Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals”, Foundations of Language 6, 89–94.
Adams, E. (1975), The Logic of Conditionals (D. Reidel: Dordrecht).
Adams, E. (1976), “Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals”, in Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science eds. W. Harper and C. Hooker (D. Reidel: Dordrecht), pp. 1–21.
Cartwright, N. (1979), “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies”, Nous 13, 419–437.
Eells, E. (this volume), “Probabilistic Causal Interaction and Disjunctive Causal Factors”, pp. 189–209.
Eells, E. and Sober, E. (1983), “Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity”, Philosophy of Science 50, 35–57.
Ellis, B. (1968), “Probability Logic”, manuscript.
Ellis, B. (1976), “Epistemic Foundations of Logic”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 5, 187–204.
Gibbard, A. (1981), “Two Recent Theories of Conditionals”, in Ifs eds. W. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (D. Reidel: Dordrecht), pp. 211–247.
Glymour, C. (1986), “Comment: Statistics and Metaphysics”, Journal of the American Statistical Association 81, 964–986.
Good, I. J. (1961–62), “A Causal Calculus”, British Journal for Philosophy of Science 11, 305–328
Good, I. J. (1961–62), “A Causal Calculus”, British Journal for Philosophy of Science 12,43–51
Good, I. J. (1961–62), “A Causal Calculus”, British Journal for Philosophy of Science 13, 88.
Granger, C. (1980), “Testing for Causality: A Personal Viewpoint”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2, 329–352.
Granger, C. (1988), “Causality Testing in a Decision Science”, in Causation, Change and Credence: Proceedings of the Irvine Conference Vol. 1, ed. B. Skyrms and W. Harper (D. Reidel: Dordrecht), pp. 3–21.
Holland, P. (1986), “Statistics and Causal Inference” (with comments by Rubin, Cox, Glymour, and Granger), Journal of the American Statistical Association 81, 945–970.
Jeffrey, R. (1964), “If” (abstract), The Journal of Philosophy 61, 702–703.
Lewis, D. (1973), “Causation” Journal of Philosophy 70, 556–567.
Lewis, D. (1974), Counterfactuals (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.).
Lewis, D. (1976), “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities”, Philosophical Review 85, 297–315.
Reichenbach, H. (1956), The Direction of Time (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles).
Salmon, W. (1971), Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance (University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh).
Salmon, W. (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J.).
Skyrms, B. (1980), Causal Necessity (Yale University Press: New Haven).
Skyrms, B. (1984) Pragmatics and Empiricism (Yale University Press: New Haven).
Skyrms, B. (1987), “Review of Suppes’ Probabilistic Metaphysics” Philosophical Review.
Skyrms, B. (forthcoming), “Probability and Causation”, Journal of Econometrics.
Stalnaker, R. (1968), “A Theory of Conditionals”, in Studies in Logical Theory, ed. N. Reseller (Blackwell: Oxford).
Stalnaker, R. (1970), “Probability and Conditionals”, Philosophy of Science 37, 68–80.
Stalnaker, R. (1984), Inquiry (Bradford Books: Boston).
Suppes, P. (1970), A Probabilistic Theory of Causality (North-Holland: Amsterdam).
Suppes, P. (1984), Probabilistic Metaphysics (Blackwell: Oxford).
van Fraassen, B. C. (1976), “Probabilities of Conditionals”, in Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science W. Harper and C. Hooker (D. Reidel: Dordrecht), pp. 261–308.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Skyrms, B. (1988). Conditional Chance. In: Fetzer, J.H. (eds) Probability and Causality. Synthese Library, vol 192. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3997-4_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3997-4_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-55608-052-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3997-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive