Abstract
Many of the results discussed above are of a negative nature; they state that the conjunction of several intuitively desirable properties of the voting procedures is not possible. In other words, regardless of which voting procedure one resorts to there is bound to be at least some plausible property or set of properties that do not characterize the procedure. The ubiquity of strategic manipulation possibilities and the paucity of voting equilibria make Riker (1982) very suspicious about the possibility of finding any method that would reasonably well reflect the tastes or preferences of the individuals in collective choices.
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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Nurmi, H. (1987). Why is There So Much Stability and How Can We Get More of It?. In: Comparing Voting Systems. Theory and Decision Library, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3985-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3985-1_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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