Hochberg on the Logic of “Extrinsic Epistemic Preferability”

Abstract

As it has been seen, efforts at evolving viable calculie of preference have been pursued mainly from two distinct directions. One seeks to formalize within a modal logic the intension of preferential expressions, considered in terms of object having intrinsic value. The other proceeds by taking preference in an extrinsic sense, and then axiomatizing preference-principles. However, beyond a few elementary relationships of preferring, e.g., (pPq) → −(qPp), (pPq & qPr) → pPr, etc., there is virtually no general consensus within any one of these two traditions of analysis as to what counts as a “genuine” preference-principle.

Excerpted from rmarks presented at the International Meetings of the Symbolic Logic Association, Patras, Greece, Summer-1980.