Metaphysical Realism and the Pragmatic Basis of Objectivity

Synopsis

(1) The ontological component of metaphysical realism — the idea that there indeed is an objective sphere of mind-independent reality which exists independently in its own right, without reference to anyone’s ideas and conceptions about it — is not something that we learn from experience. It is a presupposition for our experience-exploiting inquiries, rather than a product thereof. (2) We have to do here with a postulation made on functional rather than evidential grounds, which we endorse in order to be in a position to learn by experience at all. This postulation is justified in the first analysis on the grounds of functional requiredness, seeing that it is an indispensable requisite for our standard conceptual scheme with respect to inquiry, cognition, and discourse. (3) The project of communal inquiry into and inter-personal communication about an objective order of reality plays an especially important justificatory role. (4) Moreover, without the resource of an objective order of impersonal fact, we would be thrown back on totally non-cognitive means for the guidance of action. (5) The validation of the reality postulate thus lies originally in its potential functional utility, and ultimately in its being retro-justified by the “wisdom of hindsight” on grounds of its pragmatic and explanatory efficacy.