Abstract
The distribution of cabinet posts in multiparty coalition governments in twelve European countries in the period 1945–1983 is Considered. The efficacy of three payoff theories, namely Gamson’s proportional payoff, the kernel and the bargaining set, as predictors of portfolio distribution, are compared. It is found that the Gamson predictor is superior in five countries (Group 3) which tend to be characterized by a relatively unfragmented political system, while the bargaining set is more appropriate in the highly fragmented political systems (Group 1). The kernel can be disregarded as a payoff predictor. It is suggested that the Group 1 countries are characterized by underlying policy spaces of high dimension, and it is for this reason that government duration is low. In the Group 3 countries the policy space is of low dimension, duration is high and portfolio distribution is dictated by “normative” rules.
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Schofield, N., Laver, M. (1987). Bargaining Theory and Cabinet Stability in European Coalition Governments 1945–1983. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_8
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