Abstract
It is well known that a strategically non-manipulable voting mechanism which satisfies the Arrow condition of citizens’ sovereignty is dictatorial if it satisfies single-valuedness, and oligarchical if it satisfies binariness. This paper attempts to weaken both conditions to resolve the dilemma between strategic manipulation of a voting mechanism and an unacceptable power structure. It is shown that although the dilemma cannot be resolved completely, the power structure diminishes significantly as the single-valuedness and the binariness are relaxed. Furthermore, introducing a weaker notion of manipulability which takes account of possible counter-threats the sensitivity of power structure with the degree of binariness is established.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands
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Bandyopadhyay, T. (1987). Manipulation of Voting Mechanisms. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_4
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