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Nash Bargaining Solutions of Multiparty Bargaining Problems

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The Logic of Multiparty Systems

Part of the book series: International Studies in Economics and Econometrics ((ISEE,volume 17))

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Abstract

In multiparty systems situations often arise in which various coalitions could form and each potential coalition must decide on how the gains from their joint action should be shared. We view these situations as multilateral bargaining problems, take into account how players’ opportunities in other coalitions should affect their disagreement payoffs, and the apply the Nash bargaining solution to determine how the gains from their joint action should be shared in each potential coalition.

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References

  • Bennet, E. (1983a). “The Aspiration Approach to Predicting Coalition Formation and Payoff Distribution in Sidepayment Games”, International Journal of Game Theory, 12, 1–28

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  • Bennet, E. (1985). Multilateral Bargaining Solutions.mimeo.

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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands

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Bennett, E. (1987). Nash Bargaining Solutions of Multiparty Bargaining Problems. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8114-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3607-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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