Abstract
An important consideration in analyzing the stability of multiparty coalition governments is the modelling of the bargaining process between parties. This chapter considers a bargaining theory, known as the bargaining set, which gives payoff predictions for coalitions in the transferable value case. A proof of the existence of a bargaining set, called B* is presented. As an illustration it is shown that in Denmark after the 1957 election, B* provides a superior prediction that the Gamsom proportionality prediction.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands
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Schofield, N. (1987). Bargaining in Weighted Majority Voting Games. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8114-6
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