Abstract
The Congress of the United States can be characterized as a “mult-party” system where each legislator has a unique position on a liberal-conservative dimension. This dimension correctly classifies over 80 percent of individual roll call votes. Previous attempts to explain roll-call voting by economic characteristics of constituencies have not been developed within a spatial model of choice. Within the context of a spatial model, constituency characteristics representing state “averages” do not succeed as explanatory variables and add little, if anything, to the explanatory power of liberal-conservative position. This point is documented by the analysis of 568 Senate roll calls for 1977 and a spezific set of coal-mine roll calls previously analyzed by Kalt and Zupan.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
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Poole, K.T., Rosenthal, H. (1987). The Politigal Economy of Roll Call Voting In the “Multi-Party” Congress of the United States. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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