Abstract
This paper has been written (a) to introduce the reader to the nature of multiparty systems and the specific issues of analysis implied, (b) to prepare the readership for the problems dealt with in the contributions to this collection, (c) to give an overview of the contents of the various papers, and (d) to point out the thread which knits the papers together as well as the holes in the web which have been left for future research. The thread linking the various contributions can be identified with the notions of stability and efficiency of multiparty systems. I will come back to this in the following section. Seemingly, stability and efficiency of party and political systems, the institutional framework (like voting rules) and the expectations and behaviour of the electorate and the politicians are influenced by the notion of democracy which prevails in a society. This relationship is taken into consideration in several contributions to this volume. In order to illustrate the implicit point of departure which has been made by some authors, the two basic theories of representational democracy, the competitive model and the model of classical democracy, will be recalled in Section 3 of this introductory chapter, taking into consideration the role of parties therein. In Section 4, differences in the analytical treatment and political relevance of two-party and multiparty systems will be discussed.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands
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Holler, M.J. (1987). An Introduction into the Logic of Multiparty Systems. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_1
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