Abstract
The obvious place to begin our inquiry is with an examination of the concept of death. As it happens, in recent years there has been considerable discussion in medical and legal circles about the definition of death.1 Of course, physicians have always been concerned with the matter of a reliable sign of death. However, until recently their chief concern was the prevention of premature burial. Today the question has acquired urgency because of a number of advances in medical science, particularly in the technology of artificial life-support systems and in the techniques of organ transplantation. These life-support systems can artificially sustain functions like heart beat, the absence of which was formerly taken to be evidence of death. A patient’s heart can still be beating with the aid of a respirator though a flat EEG reading indicates “brain-death”. Should the respirator be turned off, given that the “brain-dead” patient is making economic demands on scarce hospital resources and huge psychological demands on relatives? Moreover, if the patient possesses functioning organs that can be donated for transplantation purposes then the question of the significance and definition of death is further complicated. The sooner the organs are removed from the body after somatic death (i.e. the extinction of personality), the better the chance of the graft taking. Hence deciding when the patient is dead becomes extremely important since the organs must be “alive” to be valuable while, of course, the donor must be “dead” in order that they can be removed. These ethical problems in turn also pose legal difficulties.
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References
See inter alia the following sources and the references cited therein: A. Keith Mant, “The Medical Definition of Death” in Arnold Toynbee et al., Man’s Concern With Death (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), pp. 13–24; Peter McL. Black, “Three Definitions of Death” The Monist 60 (1977): 136–146; Douglas N. Walton, On Defining Death (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1979), especially Ch. HI; Robert F. Weir, ed., Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), Part Two; Tom L. Beauchamp and Seymour Perlin, eds., Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), Part 1; P. D. G. Skegg, Law, Ethics, and Medicine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Ch. 9.
This definition has been abandoned in the 5th edition (1979) in favour of: “The cessation of life; permanent cessations of all vital functions and signs. Numerous states have enacted statutory definitions of death which include brain-related criteria.” This revised effort avoids some of my criticisms of the earlier version, but at the expense of being even more vacuous as a practical legal definition.
Reprinted in Weir, pp. 82–89; Beauchamp and Perlin, pp. 11–18. The suggestion that brain-death is a definition of death, or at least a criterion of death, is resisted in Lawrence C. Becker, “Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4 (1975): 334–359 (see especially section IV). The brain-death definition is defended in David Lamb, “Diagnosing Death” Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 (1978): 144–153; and in Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler, “Brain Death and Personal Identity” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980): 105–133.
Walton, p. 41.
For an extended discussion of this distinction see Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), Ch. 4.
Michael Tooley, “Decisions to Terminate Life and the Concept of Person” in John Ladd, ed., Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), especially sections II and IV.
Cf. Green and Wilder, pp. 117–118.
Tooley, “Decisions to Terminate Life and the Concept of Person”, pp. 75–76.
In Abortion and Infanticide (p. 161) Tooley concedes at least the latter possibility.
Graham Oddie, “What Should We Do With Human Embryos?” Interchange, forthcoming.
Abortion and Infanticide, p. 164. (My emphasis.)
For the first claim see Robert S. Morison, “Death: Process or Event?” in Weir, pp. 57–69. (This paper is criticized in Leon R. Kass, “Death as an Event: A Commentary on Robert Morison” in Weir, pp. 70–81.) For the second claim see Skegg, p. 186n.
Cf. Ninian Smart, “Philosophical Concepts of Death” in Toynbee et al, p. 28.
Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 45.
Cf. Green and Wilder, p. 116 for a similar point.
Walton, p. 47.
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© 1987 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Perrett, R.W. (1987). Death. In: Death and Immortality. Studies in Philosophy and Religion, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3529-7_2
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