Abstract
The problem which this paper attempts to solve is this: if rationality is given a rational defence, it is question-begging, and if it is not defended rationally, it is arbitrary. So that holding a belief or performing an action on rational grounds seems to be in the same epistemological position as are beliefs and actions ‘justified’ on the basis of faith, intuition, authority, taste or revelation.
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References
J. Dewey (1938) Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 104.
M. Schlick (1967) ‘The Future of Philosophy’, in R. Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn, Chicago, p. 51.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Kekes, J. (1987). Rationality and Problem-Solving. In: Agassi, J., Jarvie, I.C. (eds) Rationality: The Critical View. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3491-7_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3491-7_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-247-3455-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3491-7
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