Transcendental Reasoning and the Indeterminacy of the Human Point of View

Abstract

The human point of view is clearly an important topic for Kant, but is rarely connected with his important discussion of indeterminacy. He makes a sharp distinction between the precise notions of mathematics and the indeterminate notions of philosophy. Leibniz, by contrast, believed that a philosophy could usefully be constructed consisting of determinate notions, with its paradigm God’s clear and perfect view of reality. What we perceive as confused is just a result of our limited view of what is really clear and exact. Kant and Wittgenstein argue that we are obliged to base our most important practices upon facts and not on a metaphysically sure foundation. Our presuppositions will doubtless vary over time as our nature changes and develops, and the validity of transcendental arguments will be accordingly limited. Justification must take place within the same limited context as every other human activity, and cannot transcend the bounds of possible experience.