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Taking the Fregean Seriously

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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 39))

Abstract

According to the Fregean, ‘that’-clauses in attitude ascriptions name senses; the main verb of an ascriptions names a relation which one may bear to a sense. An ascription a V’s that Sis true iff the referent of a bears the relation named by V to the sense named by its ‘that’-clause.

My taste is for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in they help with the housework.

- H. P. GRICE

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Bibliography

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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Richard, M. (1988). Taking the Fregean Seriously. In: Austin, D.F. (eds) Philosophical Analysis. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3150-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2909-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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