Generalization, Value-Judgment and Causal Explanation in History

Abstract

Since the Second World War, English and American philosophers of history have had a good deal to say about historical explanation. To the extent that such explanation has been seen as causal — and the ultimate viability of any other kind has often been questioned — two assumptions have generally guided the analyses offered. The first is that what is to be explained must be shown to instantiate laws or universal generalizations for which reasonable empirical support can be found, and which show the predictability of what occurred. The second is that, in the determination of what constitutes the cause or causes of a given historical event or state of affairs, the value-judgments of the investigator have no role to play. In the accounts of historical explanation which these two assumptions have commonly generated, historians have often found it difficult to recognize anything much resembling their own modes of reasoning. Many have urged, in consequence, that before philosophers set about prescribing models of explanation for historical inquiry, they pay more attention to the way causal investigation in this field in fact commonly proceeds. Philosophers, of course, can scarcely be expected to renounce prescription altogether. The admonition is nevertheless one to which I think philosophers of history ought to pay some heed.