Abstract
The basic idea of probabilistic causality, as introduced by Reichenbach (1956), Good (1961–62), Suppes (1970), is that a cause raises the probability of the effect. However, not all events that raise the probability of another event can be counted as causes. In order to sort out those pairs of events that stand in a causal relation to each other, further conditions must be added. Suppes handles this by distinguishing between genuine and spurious causes as well as between direct and indirect causes.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Gärdenfors, P. (1988). Causation and the Dynamics of Belief. In: Harper, W.L., Skyrms, B. (eds) Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2865-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2865-7_5
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