Abstract
Science is accorded high value in our culture because, unlike many other intellectual endeavors, it appears capable of producing increasingly reliable knowledge. During the last quarter century a group of historians and philosophers of science (known variously as ‘theorists of scientific change’, the ‘post-positivist school’ or the ‘historical school’) has proposed theories to explain progressive change in science. Their concepts and models have received such keen attention that terms like ‘paradigm’ have passed from obscurity to common speech. In this volume, we subject key claims of some of the theorists of scientific change to just that kind of empirical scrutiny that has been so characteristic of science itself. Certain claims emerge unscathed — the existence and importance of large-scale theories (guiding assumptions) in the physical sciences for example. Others, such as the supposed importance of novel predictions or the alleged insignificance of anomalies, seem to be without foundation. We conclude that only by engaging in testing of this sort will the study of science be able to make progress.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bloor, David (1984), ‘The Strengths of the Strong Program’, in J. R. Brown (ed.) Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Brooke, John (1981), ‘Avagadro’s Hypothesis and its Fate: A Case-Study in the Failure of Case-Studies’, History of Science 19, 235–273.
Coats, A. W. (1969), ‘Is There a Structure of Scientific Revolutions in Economics?’, Kyklos 22 (2), 289–294.
Cohen, I. B. (1985), Revolution in Science, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Cook, Thomas and Campbell, Donald (1979), Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis for Field Settings, Chicago: Rand McNally.
Conant, J. B. (1967), ‘Scientific Principles and Moral Conduct’, American Scientist 55 (3), 311–328.
De Vroey, Michael (1975), ‘The Transition from Classical to Neoclassical Economics: A Scientific Revolution’, J. Economic Issues 9 (3), 415–440.
Feyerabend, Paul (1978), Against Method, London: Verso.
Feyerabend, Paul (1981), Rationalism, Realism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fleck, Ludwig (1979), Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Friedrichs, Robert (1970), A Sociology of Sociology, New York: Free Press.
Hallam, A. (1983), Great Geological Controversies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heyl, John (1975), ‘Paradigms in Social Science’, Society 12 (5), 61–67.
Hull, David, Tessner, P. and Diamond, A. (1978), ‘Planck’s Principle’, Science 202, 717–722.
Kuhn, Thomas 1970, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd enlarged edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas (1977), The Essential Tension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, Imre (1978), Philosophical Papers. Vol. I. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laudan, L. (1977), Progress and Its Problems, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Laudan, L. (1984a) Science and Values, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Laudan, L. (1984b) ‘The Pseudo-Science of Science?’, in J. R. Brown (ed.) Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Laudan, L., Donovan, A., Laudan, R., Barker, P., Brown, H., Leplin, Jarrett, Thagard, Paul, and Wykstra, Steve (1986), ‘Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research’, Synthese 69, 141–223.
Laudan, R. (1987), ‘The Rationality of Entertainment and Pursuit’, in Marcello Pera and J. Pitt (eds.) Rational Changes in Science, Boston Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.
Nickles, Thomas (1986), ‘Remarks on the Use of History as Evidence’, Synthese 69, 253–266.
Roitblatt, H. L. (1982), ‘The Meaning of Repression in Animal Memory’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3), 353–372.
Samuelson, Paul (1981), ‘Justice to the Australians’, Quart. J. Economics 96 (1), 169–170.
Stegmueller, Wolfgang (1976), The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, New York: Springer-Verlag.
Toulmin, Stephen (1967), ‘The Evolutionary Development of Natural Science’, American Scientist 55, 456–470.
Weinberg, Alvin (1970), ‘The Axiology of Science’, American Scientist 58 (6), 612–617.
Wilson, Tuzo (1968), ‘Static or Mobile Earth: The Current Scientific Revolution’, Proc. Amer. Philosophical Soc. 112, 309–320.
Wolin, Sheldon (1968), ‘Paradigms and Political Theories’, in P. King and B. Parekh (eds.), Politics and Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yin, Robert K. (1986), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Beverly Hills: Sage.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Laudan, R., Laudan, L., Donovan, A. (1988). Testing Theories of Scientific Change. In: Donovan, A., Laudan, L., Laudan, R. (eds) Scrutinizing Science. Synthese Library, vol 193. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2855-8_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2855-8_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7784-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2855-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive