Abstract
I will try in this paper to tackle in greater detail the problem of scientific persuasion, i.e. the problem of arguments scientists use in trying to persuade other scientists to reject one theory and accept another. Therefore, I am going to discuss the arguments scientists use in order to convert members of a scientific community and make them believe that a particular hypothesis is — for the moment — the best available theoretical solution to a certain scientific problem.
‘You cannot force anybody by arguments to take arguments seriously, or to respect his own reason’.1
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Notes
Popper, K.R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 391.
Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 147.
v. Ibid., p. 149.
v. Ibid., p. 151.
v. Ibid., pp. 151–152. The Belgian philosopher H. Perelman, in his treatises on general theory of argumentation, differentiates between ‘persuasion’ (or ‘convincing’), which requires rational means, and ‘talking into’ (or ‘animating’), which relies on irrational means.
Ibid., p. 152.
v. Ibid., p. 153.
v. Ibid., pp. 154–155.
Ibid., pp. 156–157.
v. Ibid., pp. 67, 84 & 149.
Ibid., pp. 198–200.
Ibid., pp. 200–201.
Ibid., p. 201.
Ibid., pp. 202–203.
v. Ibid., p. 204.
v. Kordig, C.R., The Justification of Scientific Change. Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1971, p. 93.
v. Hanson, N.R., Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge, University Press, 1959, p. 182.
Nagel, E., ‘The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences’, in Philosophy of Science, ed. by A. Danto & S. Morgenbesser, Cleveland, World Publ. Co., 1960, p. 291.
v. Kordig, C.R., Op. cit., p. 97.
v. Rudner, R., The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgements7, Philosophy of Science, 1953, vol. 20, No. 1, p. 3.
v. Jeffrey, R.C., ‘Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses’, Philosophy of Science, 1956, vol. 23, No. 3, p. 245.
v. Barber, B., ‘Resistance of Scientists to Scientific Discovery’, Science, 1961, vol. 134, No. 3479.
v. Lakatos, I., Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, ed. by J. Worrall & G. Currie, Cambridge, University Press, 1978, pp. 107–112.
Philosophy of Science, 1979, vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 1–32.
v. Fayerabend, P.K., ‘Realism and Instrumentalism: Comments on the Logic of Factual Support’, in: The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, ed. by M. Bunge, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1964, p. 305.
v. Einstein, A. & Infeld, L., The Evolution of Physics, Cambridge, University Press, 1961, pp. 235–240.
v. Ratio, 1973, vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 183–205.
Whewell, W., Novum Organon Renovatum, London, 1858, p. 81.
Whewell, W., Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences., vol. II London, 1847, pp. 67–68.
Ibid., p. 64.
v. Thagard, P.R., ‘The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1978, vol. LXXV, No. 2, pp. 81–85.
Darwin, Ch., The Origin of Species, New York, Collier, 1962, p. 476.
v. Thagard, P.R.., Op. cit., p. 87.
Ibid., p. 90.
v. Ibid., p. 91.
v. Laudan, L., Progress and Its Problems, Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 83–84.
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Novaković, S. (1988). Scientific Persuasion. In: Pavković, A. (eds) Contemporary Yugoslav Philosophy: The Analytic Approach. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2821-3_13
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