Abstract
The aim of the present chapter is to consider some basic elements of Hegel’ views on economic matters in the light of the Scottish influence on him. Before beginning the account of a market economy which Hegel gives in his “System of Needs”, it is necessary to bring to mind that he had previously provided — in his section on ‘Abstract Right’ (§§34–104) — some of the very presuppositions which Smith’s and Steuart’s models of economic life required for their proper functioning, most notably, private property, the existence of money as a general means of exchange, and an elaborate system of private law, centring on the law of contract. These presuppositions, though not always explicitly re-stated, are supposed to be effictive throughout the “System of Needs”. Like-wise, these pre-conditions of the ‘system of needs’ are later comple-mented in his ‘Rechtspflege’ (‘The Administration of Law’ ; §§ 209–229, an account of the means by which abstract right is enforced. A detailed consideration of these features goes beyond the scope of the present work,2 but it will be shown briefly that the institutional, jurisprudential framework of Hegel’s economic model already betrays significant par-allels with the Scots’ views.
In political economy [Volkswirtschaft] everything is done out of personal interest, but nature arranges it in such a manner that it serves ethical purposes. [...] Ethical life is the higher reason which, as Hegel expresses it, possesses enough cunning to create an ethical purpose behind the backs of men, a purpose which they neither anticipated nor intended. C.L. Michelet (1866).1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Carl Ludwig Michelet, Naturrecht und Rechtsphilosophie als die praktische Philosophie enthaltend Rechts-, Sitten- und Gesellschaftslehre. In 2 vols. (Berlin, 1866) Vol. I, pp. 6 f.
See: Joachim Ritter, “Person und Eigentum”, and Peter Landau, “Hegels Begründung des Vertragsrechts”, both in Manfred Riedel (1975) Vol. II, pp. 152–175 and 176–197 respectively.
VRP, Vol. II, § 46, p. 216 - TMK, p. 42: “Since my will, as the will of a person, and so as a single will, becomes objective to me in property, property acquires the character of private property.”
This difference has recently been clarified by Christopher Berry, “Property and Possession: Two Replies to Locke — Hume and Hegel”, J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman (Eds.), Property (New York, 1980) pp. 89–100; a comparison which throws light on both accounts.
Cp.: Landau/Riedel (1975) Vol. II, pp. 180 f.
VRP, Vol. II, § 71, p. 296 - TMK, p. 57: “Contract presupposes that the parties entering it recognize each other as persons and property owners. It is a relationship at the level of mind objective, and so contains and presupposes from the start the moment of recognition.”
VRP, Vol. II, § 63, p. 260 - TMK, p. 51; for Aristotle’s own exposition see: Nicomachean Ethics Book V.8. I have used the German edition: Die Nikomachische Ethik. Translated and edited by Olof Gigon (Zürich, 2nd edition, 1967) pp. 163–166.
Peter Landau, I think, makes this point in too sweeping a manner: Landau/Riedel (1975) Vol. II, p. 182.
VRP, Vol. II, pp. 261 f; cp.: Hegel’s early distinction between ‘ideal’ and ‘empirical measure’ of goods (SdS, p. 437).
A gulf, incidentally, which supports our previous claim that Hegel’s direct knowledge of Ricardo was rather limited.
A point which Paul Chamley (1969, p. 157) has rightly stressed.
This definition is illustrated with the example of “silver-plate curiously wrought” of which “the intrinsic worth subsists entire” (SJS, Vol. I, p. 312).
SJS, Vol. II, p. 409: “The value of things depends upon many circumstances, which however may be reduced to four principal heads: First, The abundance of the things to be valued. Secondly, The demand which mankind make for them. Thirdly, The competition between the demanders; and Fourthly, The extent of the faculties of the demanders.”
SdS, pp. 32 + 66; HGW, Vol. VI, p. 324; HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 225.
VRP, Vol. II, note to § 63, p. 263; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, pp. 240 f; VRP, Vol. IV, p. 229; and Hegel’s aphorism of the Berlin period: “Money is the abbreviation of all external need” (TWA, Vol. XI, p. 565).
SJSW, Vol. I, p. 42: “By Money, I understand any commodity, which purely in itself is of no material use to man for the purposes above-mentioned, but which acquires such an estimation from his opinion of it, as to become the universal measure of what is called value, and an adequate equivalent for any thing alienable.” See also: SJSW, Vol. II, pp. 270–278.
This point has been stressed by George E. Davie, “Anglophobe and Anglophil”, SJPE, Vol. XIV (1967) pp. 291–302, here p. 296.
SJS, Vol. I, p. 20: “Man we find acting uniformly in all ages, in all countries, and in all climates, from the principles of self-interest...”
For Smith, there is not only the famous passage in the “Wealth of Nations”, on the butcher, brewer, and baker whose self-interest makes them provide our dinner (SGE, Vol. II. 1, pp. 26 f), but also a number of passages from the “TMS”: SGE, Vol. I, pp. 85 f, 135, 173.
VRP, Vol. I, p. 308- Cp.: VRP, Vol. II, § 182, p. 633-TMK, p. 122: “The concrete person, who is himself the object of his particular aims...”; VRP, Vol. II, § 187, p. 636 -TMK, p. 124; TWA, Vol. VII, Addition to § 182+, p. 339- TMK, p. 267:“In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is nothing to him.”
VRP, Vol. III, p. 472: “The particular interest of individuals”.
VRP, Vol. II, § 183, p. 633-TMK, p. 123: “selfish ends”; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 569; VRP, Vol. IV, p. 473.
Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, Hans Reiss (Ed.), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge, 1970) p. 44.
My own translation of: VRP, Vol. I, p. 308.
VRP, Vol. II, § 196, p. 644 - TMK, p. 128.
TWA, Vol. VII, § 189+, p. 347: “dieses Wimmeln von Willkür — TMK,” p. 268: “this medley of arbitrariness”. Cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 576 & Vol. IV, pp. 486, 491 f.
The whole purpose of AF1 could be described as a ‘natural history of man’ and Ferguson is highly explicit about this methodological feature (AF1, pp. 4 f); see also AF2, pp. 15–75, and compare Smith’s ‘Lectures on Jurisprudence’ (SGE, Vol. V, pp. 333 ff & 487 ff).
Adam Ferguson, Grundsatze der Moralphilosphie. Uebersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Christian Garve (Leipzig, 1772) pp. 300 f.
SGE, Vol. II, 1, p. 181: “... the desire of the conveniences and ornaments of building, dress, equipage, and household furniture, seems to have no limit or certain boundary... those desires as opposed to the desire of food... cannot be satisfied, but seem to be altogether endless.”
SJS, Vol. I, p. 139: “there are no bounds to the consumption of work...”
VRP, Vol. III, p. 576. In his “Theory of Moral Sentiments” Smith actually uses the very formulation “insatiable desires” (SGE, vol. I, p. 184).
Marginal note to Hotho’s lecture notes; according to Ilting, this note was dictated by Hegel’s assistant, Leopold von Henning (VRP, Vol. III, p. 574 and cp.: pp. 81 ff.
Especially Smith: SGE, Vol. V, pp. 333 f & 487 f.
VRP, Vol. II, § 190, p. 641 - TMK, p. 127: “... by the differentiation and division of concrete need into single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, particularized and so more abstract.” Cp.: VRP, Vol. III, pp. 590 f, Vol. IV, p. 489.
VRP, Vol. III, pp. 591 ff (my own italics; N.W.); cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 243; VRP, Vol. I, p. 311 & Vol. II, § 191, p. 542 - TMK, p. 127 & Vol. III, p. 588 (L.v. Henning). -Man’s refinement of desires and corresponding skills is equally stressed by Smith and Ferguson: AF1, pp. 6 f & 168; SGE, Vol. II, 1, p. 181 & Vol. V, p. 335.
Compare the growing literature on Hegel’s concept of labour: Ivan Dubsky, Hegels Arbeitsbegriff und die idealistische Dialektik (Prag, 1961);
Bernhard Lakebrink, “Geist und Arbeit im Denken Hegels”, Philosophisches, Jahrbuch Vol. 70 (1962/63) pp. 98–108;
Sok-Zin Lim, Der Begriff der Arbeit bei Hegel. Versuch einer Interpretation der Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bonn, 2nd ed. 1966).
TWA, Vol. VII, § 191 +, p. 349 - TMK, p. 269; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 593. — Adam Smith does indeed use the word “comfortably” in a passage which distinguishes ‘necessaries’ from ‘luxuries’ (SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 869 f).
Paul Chamley (1963) tentatively suggested this parallel (pp. 88 f), but as the Berlin lectures were not available to him, his case was less convincing.
AF2, p. 66; cp.: AF1, p. 7: Even “naked in the woods” man finds a “badge of superiority” in “the strength of his limbs and the sagacity of his mind”; Hume, “Essays”, p. 309, note 1.
AF2, p. 31: “Men, in all ages, are fond of decoration.”
SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 869 f: “By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without.”
AF1, p. 7: “The occupations of men, in every condition, bespeak their freedom of choice, their various opinions, and the multiplicity of wants by which they are urged...”
As opposed to his implicit use of the concept of ‘labour’ in his discussion of property.
VRP, Vol. IV, p. 496 (my own italics; N.W.) - cp.: VRP, Vol. II, § 196, p. 644-TMK, p. 128.
TMK, § 196, p. 128; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 601.
For the wider implications of ‘Bildung’ in the ‘Phenomenology’, compare: I. Dubsky (1961); B. Lakebrink (1962/63); S.-Z. Lim (1966).
TMK, § 197, p. 129; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, pp. 605 f & Vol. IV, p. 500.
Paul Chamley, “La Doctrine Economique De Hegel Et La Conception Hégélienne Du Travail”, HSBh 4 (Bonn, 1969) pp. 147–159.
Cp.: P. Chamley (1969) p. 155: “Il est donc faux de dire que, dans la doctrine économique hégélienne, le travail joue a lui seul, par lui-même, un rôle mediateur. C’est là le rôle du travail et de l’échange, du travail pour l’échange.”
SJS, Vol. I, p. 17; cp.: ibid., p. 89: “... the best way of binding a free society together is by multiplying reciprocal obligations, and creating a general dependence between all its members.” (my own italics in both quotations; N.W.).
Helmut Reichelt’s introduction to his edition of: G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Frankfurt, 1972) p. xxxvi.
A criticism frequently directed against Adam Smith as well as Hegel. With regard to Smith, this criticism can be found in: G. Myrdal, Das politische Element in der nationalökonomischen Doktrinbildung (Hannover, 2nd edition, 1963) pp. 158 f; Lucio Coletti, “Mandeville, Rousseau è Smith”, Ideologia è Societa (Bari, 3rd edition, 1972) pp. 288 ff. Helmut Reichelt (1972) may serve as an example of the application of this criticism to Hegel.
Karl-Heinz Ilting and others have rightly stressed that the systematic shape of Hegel’s early economic views, as contained in the “System der Sittlichkeit” (1802/3), follows the first book of Aristotle’s “Politics”; cp.: K.-H. Ilting, “Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Politik”, Philosophisches Jahrbuch. Vol. 71 (München, 1963/64) pp. 38–58. However, the Aristotelian frame soon proved inadequate for the integration of the modern materials, as derived from the Scottish economists, and thus sank to the position of a dwindling influence.
TMK, § 299, p. 195; see also TMK, §§ 185, 206, 262+; pp. 123 f, 133, 280 & VRP, Vol. III, pp. 634 f & 722; Vol. IV, pp. 523 & 637. A worthwhile, though partly dated, treatment of Hegel’s criticism of Plato is to be found in M.B. Foster, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel (Oxford, 1935) Chapter III, pp. 72–98; appendix E, pp. 101–109.
In this context, Hutcheson appeals to pity, “the sentiments of compassion and humanity,... even tho’ it [slavery] could be vindicated by some plea of external right [this is alluding to the case of captives].” Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosphy (London, 1755) Vol. II, p. 203 - Cp.: Wylie Sypher, “Hutcheson and the ‘Classical’ Theory of Slavery”, Journal of Negro History (1939) Vol. XXIV, pp. 263–280.
In this context, Hutcheson refers to “the natural rights of mankind” and appeals to his readers’ “sense of natural justice”: Hutcheson (1755) Vol. II, pp. 201 & 85. - Cp.: T.D. Campbell, “Francis Hutcheson: ‘Father’ of the Scottish Enlightenment”, R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner (Eds.), The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Englightenment (Edinburgh, 1982) pp. 167–185, here pp. 177 f.
AF1, p. 185: “We feel its injustice [of slavery]; we suffer for the helot, under the severities and unequal treatment to which he was exposed...” & AF2, p. 201: “No contract or forfeiture can deprive a man of all his rights, or render him the property of another. No one is born a slave; because every one is born with all his original rights.”
Duncan Forbes, “Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment”, R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner (1982) pp. 186–204, here p. 193.
For contemporary critical reaction, see: The Critical Review. Vol. 23 (1767) p. 413 & The Monthly Review. Vol. 36 (1767) p. 465. Both reviews disapproved of Steuart’s example of slavery: Lycurgus’ Sparta, an example which will soon be commented upon in greater detail. — Johannes Hoffmeister, in his notes to DHE (P. 467), misrepresents Steuart’s position as recommending slavery (“empfiehlt.. direkte Sklavenhalterei”).
SJS, Vol. I, pp. 168 f: “Where hands therefore are principally necessary, the slaves have the advantage; where heads are principally necessary, the advantage is in favour of the free.”
David Hume, The History of England. In 8 vols. (Oxford, 1826) Vol. I, chapter 3, Appendix, Section 5: “The Several Orders of Men”, pp. 186–189.
Cp.: Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics (Cambridge, 1975) p. 311.
SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 681; cp.: SGE, Vol. V, p. 192 and Vol. II. 1, p. 80: “.. . Indostan or antient Egypt (where every man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the occupation of his father, and was supposed to commit the most horrid sacrilege if he changed it for another)... (my own italics; N.W.) — Hegel also refers to “a religious authority” (TMK, § 206, p. 133).
Compare VRP, Vol. II, § 299, p. 766 - TMK, p. 195 with SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 681.
SJS, Vol. II, p. 381: “We see by the works of Xenophon, of Plato, of Aristotle, and of many other writers of merit, that, in their age, all professions which were calculated to gain money, were regarded as unworthy of a freeman ... Plato would have a citizen punished who should enter commerce.” Cp.: SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 388.
This has convincingly been demonstrated by H.F. Fulda, Das Recht der Philosophie in Hegels Philosophie des Rechts (Franfurt, 1968), pp. 48 f.
DHW, Vol. III, p. 291: “It is well known with what peculiar laws Sparta was governed, and what a prodigy that republic is justly esteemed by every one, who has considered human nature as it has displayed itself in other nations, and other ages. Were the testimony of history less positive and circumstantial, such a government would appear a mere philosophical whim or fiction, and impossible ever to be reduced to practice.” (my own italics; N.W.)
SJS, Vol. I, p. 218: “Of this plan [of Lycurgus’ republic] we have a description in the life of this legislator written by Plutarch ...” — AF1, pp. 62, 157, 196, 229.
SJS, Vol. I, p. 220: “Whatever regards any other object than his plan of political economy, shall here be passed over in silence.”
S.R. Sen came to a similar conclusion: The Economics of Sir James Steuart (London, 1957) p. 133.
SJS, Vol. I, pp. 220–223; compare those aspects with Hegel’s fullest treatment of Sparta, in the “Lectures on the Philosophy of World History”, TWA, Vol. XII, pp. 319–323.
These fragments were first edited by Karl Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 520 f & 525 and are now conveniently to be found in DHE, pp. 263 f, 268 f and TWA, Vol. I, p. 434.
According to Rosenkranz, they belong to Hegel’s Bern period, but Hoffmeister, Lukács and others consider them to be from the Frankfurt years.
See above, p. 164; cp.: Sen (1957) p. 131.
DHE, p. 268 (my own italics; N.W.) — TWA, Vol. I, p. 439; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 169 & 221.
Wilhelm Seeberger, Hegel oder die Entwicklung des Geistes zur Freiheit (Stuttgart, 1961).
Cp.: SJS, Vol. I, p. 217: “When once a state begins to subsist by the consequences of industry, there is less danger to be apprehended from the power of the sovereign.” — AF1,
pp. 143 f; 261: “It has been found, that, except in a few singular cases, the commercial and political arts have advanced together.”
AF1, p. 160; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 218 ff.
AF1, p. 263; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 70 f.
Hume (1826) Vol. III, pp. 262–270 “Remarks on the Progress of Science and Government.”
William Robertson, The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V. [1769], here quoted from The Works of William Robertson. In 12 vols. (London, 1824) Vol. IV, pp. 196–210, 233–240.
The German ‘Die ‘Stande’ implies both ‘social classes’ and ‘estates’ (in their political function), see: VRP, Vol. II, § 303, p. 773 - TMK, p. 197 f. Since, in what follows, I am mainly dealing with the social dimension, I have used the rendering ‘classes’ throughout the present section.
See: Franz Rosenzweig (1920) Vol. I, p. 138; Vol. II, p. 122; and the more recent study by R.K. Hocevar, Hegel und der Preussische Staat (München, 1973) pp. 86–90. The implied irrelevance of Hegel’s discussion is perhaps the main reason why this aspect of Hegel’s thought has received comparatively little attention.
It is disputed, however, whether one should identify the traditional nobility or Napoleon’s ennobled military officers with this level of Hegel’s account; cp.: Haym (1857) p. 177; Rosenzweig (1920) Vol. I, p. 135; Lukács (1973) Vol. II, p. 584.
SdS, pp. 472 f- SoEL, p. 153: “The former utility is that the first class is the absolute and real ethical shape and so, for the other classes, the model of the self-moving and self-existent Absolute, the supreme real intuition which ethical nature demands.”
SdS, p. 473 - SoEL, p. 153: “The latter utility, according with the mode of the other classes, lies in the negative [i.e. in labour], and on the part of the first class labour is established likewise, but it is the absolutely indifferent labour of government and courage.”
SdS, p. 475 - SoEL, p. 155: “The greatest height which this class can attain by its productive activity is (a) its contribution to the needs of the first class and (b) aid to the needy.”
SdS, p. 473 - SoEL, p. 153.
SdS, p. 476 - SoEL, p. 156.
ibid.
HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 269
Rosenzweig thus seems to over-emphasize the difference when he contrasts Hegel’s views of 1802, characterized by feudalism and estates [‘aristokratisch-ständisch’], with a later level of ‘monarchisch-bürokratisch’ (1920) Vol. I, p. 189.
TWA, Vol. III, pp. 435 & 513; TWA, Vol. IV, p. 63.
SJS, Vol. I, p. 301: “There must be a third class; to wit, those who are maintained and taken care of at the expense of the whole community, in order to serve as a defence.”
SJS, Vol. I, p. 57 — It ought to be remembered that ‘industry’ is a technical term for Steuart (SJS, Vol. I, p. 146).
G.E. Davie (SJPE, 1967) p. 292 — My argument is indebted to Dr. Davie’s interpretation of Steuart’s ‘middlemen’.
SJS, Vol. I, p. 149: “... the better to simplify our ideas, we supposed the transition to be direct from the manufacturer to the consumer, and both to be members of the same society.” (my own italics; N.W.)
SJS, Vol. I, p. 16: “The statesman (this is a general term to signify the legislature and supreme power, according to the form of government) ...”
SJSW, Vol. V, p. 227; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 142–145.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Waszek, N. (1988). Hegel’s Account of the Market Economy. In: The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account of ‘Civil Society’. Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 120. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2750-6_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2750-6_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7735-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2750-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive