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The Pseudorealization Fallacy and the Chinese Room Argument

Chapter
Part of the Studies in Cognitive Systems book series (COGS, volume 1)

Abstract

John Searle with his now-famous Chinese room argument (1980, 1982, 1984) challenges the basis for a strong version of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Searle’s argument has generated diverse and often strong reactions. Roland Puccetti says, “On the grounds he has staked out, which are considerable, Searle seems to me completely victorious,” (1980, p. 441). Douglas Hofstadter remarks, “This religious diatribe against AI, masquerading as a serious scientific argument, is one of the wrongest, most infuriating articles I have ever read in my life” (1980, p. 433). My reaction to Searle’s argument is that it is dead right and dead wrong. That is, his argument is right about a wrong conception of AI and wrong about a right conception of AI. But regardless of one’s position on the Chinese room argument, there is no doubt that the argument raises critical issues about the nature and foundation of AI.

Keywords

Causal Power Computational Theory Chinese Writing Chinese Room Integrate Circuit Chip 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyDartmouth CollegeHanoverUSA

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