Metaphysical Arguments for Internalism and Why They don’t Work

Abstract

The representational theory of mind is committed to the view that at least some mental states represent or refer to items in the outside world. Nonetheless, some proponents of the representational theory have argued that in our psychological theorizing, we should not individuate or taxonomize mental states in terms of the external items which they represent or to which they refer (Field 1978, Fodor 1980, 1987, Stich 1978, 1983). They claim that mental states should be type-individuated entirely on the basis of their roles within the organism’s internal causal structure and without reference to any external or contextual facts about the organism’s environment. We may label such views internalist, and describe as externalist any contrary view according to which contextual or environmental factors should be reflected in our scheme for type-individuating psychological states.

Work on this paper was supported by a fellowship from the Syracuse University Senate Research Committee, 1987.