Functionalism, Behaviorism, and Rationalism

  • R. J. Nelson
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 155)


Many of the notions of rule of mind, behavior and structure, and arguments for mechanism apply broadly to other theories of mind that are usually referred to collectively as ‘computationalism’. On the whole these do not have anything much to say about sentience — mental occurrents — while all of them claim that mental features, dispositions, etc. are subjects independent of biology and physics. They differ in nontrivial philosophical detail while still sharing a common distrust of ghosts and other mental substances, and a fondness for autonomous, essentially irreducible, cognitive psychology. My aim here is to bring to the fore key philosophical issues about individuation of mental entities and how they fit into overall cognitive anatomy.


Psychological State Tacit Knowledge Turing Machine Mental Feature Phenomenal Quality 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. J. Nelson
    • 1
  1. 1.Truman P. Handy Professor of PhilosophyCase Western Reserve UniversityUSA

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