Abstract
Is it fanciful to to describe law as purposeful? The common reader will readily acknowledge that there must be some point to criminal legislation and punishment. It would be a nasty joke if there were no aim to the business of prohibiting and prescribing conduct, arresting and trying suspects, pronouncing and imposing punishment. Whatever our conception of the goals and procedures appropriate to criminal legislation and punishment, no one will seriously argue that the legal enterprise is conducted without any end in view.
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Notes
F. H. Bradley (1927), Essay I.
Ryle (1969), 69.
See H. L. A. Hart’s analysis of ‘role responsibility’: Hart (1968), 212–214.
John Searle (1977), 144.
Ryle (1969) 69–71.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Sistare, C.T. (1989). Responsibility and Criminal Law. In: Responsibility and Criminal Liability. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2440-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2440-6_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7601-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2440-6
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