When Can What You Don’t Know Hurt You?
There seem to be Gettier cases that do not involve any false beliefs that the coherentist must say involve knowledge. In order to avoid this result the coherentist must attribute false assumptions to the subject, but that forces him to say that knowledge is lacking in certain cases involving misleading, unpossessed evidence. I will argue that the coherentist cannot escape this dilemma. That is because knowledge requires reliable, non-negligent belief formation where, in addition, the subject does not hold a true belief by sheer luck, and coherentism cannot adequately account for any of these conditions.
KeywordsTrue Belief Gettier Case False Assumption Coherence Theory Justify True Belief
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