Replies and Clarifications
I wish to express my gratitude to the authors of the foregoing essays for the impressive skill and care that they have expended on my work. They have done so well that I have not surprisingly found it impossible to deal adequately with all that they have said in the space available to me in the present volume. Thus while I have done my best to focus on the most important and potentially telling criticisms, there are some valuable points which have been omitted from the present discussion and others with regard to which I have been unable to do much more than suggest a line of response, postponing more detailed consideration and argument to other occasions. I have also confined myself entirely to discussions directed explicitly at my views, which has meant ignoring much that is of interest in the essays in the other sections of the present volume. To make things a bit less chaotic for the reader, I have adopted the organizing principle of dealing with topics in roughly the same order in which the corresponding discussions occur in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge 1 (hereafter SEK).
KeywordsBasic Belief Epistemic Justification Epistemic Rationality Coherence Theory Empirical Justification
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- 1.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. References to the pages of this book will use the indicated abbreviation and will be placed in the text. All other references in the text are to the pages of the present volume.Google Scholar
- 2.See Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 393–4, footnote 21.Google Scholar
- 3.See Marshall Swain, Reasons and Knowledge, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981.Google Scholar