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The Multiple Faces of Knowing: The Hierarchies of Epistemic Species

  • Hector-Neri Castañeda
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 44)

Abstract

Claims, and attributions, of knowledge or justified belief are made against varying backgrounds of assumptions or takings for granted, which are not themselves known or justifiedly believed. Offering an account of the constitution of epistemic backgrounds and an elucidation of their roles are the main parts of a Theory of Epistemic Coherence. This study belongs to the foundations of such a theory. We examine some data and discuss certain theoretical alternatives.

Keywords

Justify Belief Deontic Logic Epistemic Justification Background Assumption Local Account 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hector-Neri Castañeda
    • 1
  1. 1.Indiana UniversityUSA

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