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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 44))

Abstract

The theories of epistemic justification advanced in recent years are commonly offered as contributions to an adequate conception of knowledge and are, perhaps in consequence, either foundational or coherentist.1 I take exception to such theories here, arguing that they exaggerate the importance of knowledge for an adequate epistemology. I claim that an adequate epistemology requires a central concept of epistemic justification not subordinate to the concept of knowledge and that the needed concept (which I attempt to identify) should presupppose a new theory of empirical justification — one that is neither foundational nor coherentist. Since the theory I accept has interesting affinities with the coherence theory recently developed by Laurence BonJour,2 I comment freely on his theory in supporting my alternative.

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John W. Bender

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Aune, B. (1989). Epistemically Justified Opinion. In: Bender, J.W. (eds) The Current State of the Coherence Theory. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 44. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7563-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2360-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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