Abstract
Philosophers who reject foundationalism affirm either that there is not, or that there cannot be, a foundation of knowledge. A typical argument in support of the former claim runs as follows. For there to be a foundation of knowledge, there would have to be a sufficient number of beliefs that enjoy an evidential privilege such as infallibility, indubitability, or incorrigibility. For only by virtue of possessing such an evidential privilege could a belief be an instance of direct knowledge and then serve as a foundation forindirect knowledge. However, as a matter of psychological fact, far too few beliefs meet this condition for there to be a sufficient number of foundational beliefs. Hence indirect knowledge does not rest on any foundation.1
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Steup, M. (1989). BonJour’s Anti-Foundationalist Argument. In: Bender, J.W. (eds) The Current State of the Coherence Theory. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 44. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_17
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