Abstract
The influence Thomas Reid exerted on C.S. Peirce is well known. (1) The American founder of pragmatism more than once recognized his debt to the Scottish philosopher.(2) Reid’s theory of immediate perception, his sophisticated realism, and many aspects of his Common Sense approach are almost entirely adopted by Peirce,(3) who also stresses the acuteness and precision of Reid’s analyses in psychology,(4) while he blames Hamilton for his frequent errors of interpretation.(5)
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Notes
See, for example, Feibleman (1944, pp. 113–20) and Flower (1980, pp. 94–103). Reid, with Berkeley, Kant and Bain, was a favourite author for discussion among the group including Green, James and Peirce which was to found the ‘Metaphysical Club’ from which pragmatism arose. Peirce himself admitted that pragmatism was but a ‘corollary’ of Bain’s definition of belief. See Fisch (1954, pp. 413–44).
See, for example, Peirce (1931–1958; I, 19, 38, 240; V, 56, 444, 523, 539, 608; VII, 580n; VIII, 123n, 261). References are given by volume and paragraph number.
Peirce (1931–1958; V, 444, 523; VI, 95; VIII, 261).
For example, Peirce (1931–1958; V, 444) describes Reid as “a subtle but well-balanced intellect”, and (VIII, 123n) as “a singularly accurate observer, whose lessons have not yet been thoroughly learned by psychologists”. Further, (ibid.) Peirce cites Reid as having been the first “distinctly to recognise that we have something like a direct perception of duration, or at least, of motion” and to “draw the needful distinction between the lapse of time during the act of perception and the lapse of time represented in the percept”.
For example, Peirce (1931–1958; I, 38) writes how “Hamilton stupidly objects to Reid’s phrase ‘immediate memory’”. Peirce’s criticism merits recognition, since he anticipated the view which was later to emerge of Hamilton’s responsibility for errors of interpretation and the relative disaffection Reid’s philosophy was to undergo. See Greenberg (1976) or Brody (1971).
See, for example, some judgments by Grave (1960) or Griffen-Collard (1979).
IP, II, xx (Works, pp. 327–8).
IP, II, xx (Works, p. 327). See also I, II, v (Works, p. 107).
IP, II, xxi (Works, p. 332); Cf. I, VI, xxiv (Works, p. 196).
I, VI, xx (Works, pp. 545–9).
IP, II, xx (Works, p. 327).
IP, IV, i (Works, p. 360).
I, II, v (Works, p. 107).
Peirce (1931–58; V, 487) explains its psychological meaning thus: “Multiple reiterated behaviour of the same kind, under similar combinations of percepts and fancies, produces a tendency — the habit — actually to behave in a similar way under similar circumstances in the future”. Physiologically speaking, habits are general ways of behaviour which are associated with the removal of stimuli (VI, 264); as such, they may be found in all actual things, in rivers as well as in animals, in plants as well as in crystalline substances (VI, 260).
This is scarcely different from Bain’s definition of belief as preparedness to act.
In that respect, Peirce’s definition of belief seems perfectly compatible with the attribution of beliefs to animals. See the analysis of Engel (1984, p. 408): “Ceconcept de croyance semble, dans la mesure ou l’assertion d’une proposition n’est pas necessaire a son attribution, parfaitement compatible avec l’attribution de croyances dispositionnelles a des animaux. Ainsi, l’assertion d’une proposition, un sentiment de conviction peuvent faire partie de cette conception dispositionnelle. Mais ils n’en sont nila condition necessaire ni la condition suffisante”. Compare Peirce (1931–58; II, 148): “A belief need not be conscious. When it is recognized, the act of recognition is called by logicians a judgment, although this is properly a term of psychology”.
“Every belief is belief in a proposition. Indeed, every proposition has its predicate which expresses what is believed and its subjects which express of what it is believed” (Peirce, 1931–58; V, 542). Compare Reid (IP, II, xx, Works, p. 327): “Belief is always expressed in language by a proposition, wherein something is affirmed or denied. This is the form of speech which in all languages is appropriated to that purpose, and without belief there could be neither affirmation nor denial, nor should we have any form of words to express either”.
Cf. Peirce (1931–58; II, 148): “What particularly distinguishes a general belief, or opinion, such as is an inferential conclusion, from other habits, is that it is active in the imagination. If I have a habit of putting ray left leg into my trouser before the right, when I imagine that I put on my trousers, I shall probably not definitely think of putting the left leg on first. But if I believe that fire is dangerous, and I imagine a fire bursting out close beside me, I shall also imagine that I jump back”. In such a case belief involves judgment: “we virtually resolve, upon a certain occasion to act as if certain imagined circumstances were perceived” (II, 435). Thus beliefs construct imaginary conditions which “determine schemata or imaginary skeleton diagrams” (II, 148). This act “which amounts to such a resolve, is a peculiar act of the will whereby we cause an image, or icon, to be associated in a particularly strenuous way, with an object represented to us by an index. This act itself is represented in the proposition by a symbol, and the consciousness of it fulfils the function of a symbol in the judgment. Suppose, for example, I detect a person with whom I have to deal in an act of dishonesty, I have in mind something like a ‘composite photograph’ of all the persons that I have known and read of that have had that character, and at the instant I make the discovery, concerning that person, who is distinguished from others for me by certain indications, upon that index, at that moment down goes the stamp of RASCAL, to remain indefinitely”.
“It does not follow that because every theoretical belief is, at least indirectly, a practical belief, this is the whole meaning of the theoretical belief” (V, 538).
“A belief is an intelligent habit upon which we shall act when occasion presents itself” (V, 398). Cf. V, 545; V, 542.
Peirce explicitly cites Reid as illustrating the part of the unexpected necessary in accounting for the reality of ourbeliefs. Cf. Peirce (1931–58; V, 542).
Cf. note 10 supra.
AP, III, I, ii (Works, p. 545–6).
AP, III, I, i (Works, p. 545).
Ibid.
( AP, III, II, iii (Works, p. 550).
Ibid.
Ibid.
AP, III, I, iii (Works, pp. 550–1).
AP, II, iii (Works, p. 540).
AP, II, iii (Works, pp. 539 & 541).
AP, II, iii (Works, p. 540).
AP, II, iii (Works, p. 541).
IP, I, i (Works, p. 221).
Ibid.
AP, I, i (Works, pp. 512–3).
AP, I, i (Works, p. 514).
Ibid.
Ibid.
AP, I, v (Works, p. 525).
Peirce (1931–58; V, 542).
Peirce (1931–58; V, 402).
Peirce (1931–58; V, 400).
Such a conception has of course enormous consequences for the versions of Realism the two philosophers maintain. Thus Peirce holds: “To assert that a law positively exists is to assert that it will operate, and therefore to refer to the future, even though conditionally. But to say that a body is hard, or red, or heavy, or of a given weight, or has any other property, is to say that it is subject to law and therefore, is a statement referring to the future” (V, 545). So if I assert ‘This wafer looks red’, it can only mean that “so far as the character of the percept can ever be ascertained, it will be ascertained that the wafer looked red” (V, 542); and to believe that a sulphur is yellow is to say that “it would be perfectly meaningless to say that sulphur had the singular property of turning pink when nobody was looking at it” (V, 545). Compare this with the following claim by Reid: “When the parts of a body adhere so firmly that it cannot easily be made to change its figure, we call it hard; when its parts are easily displaced, we call it soft. This is the notion which all mankind have of hardness and softness; they are neither sensations, nor like any sensation; they were real qualities before they were perceived by touch, and continue to be so when they are not perceived; for if any man will affirm that diamonds were not hard till they were handled, who would reason with him?” (I, V, ii, Works, p. 120).
Peirce (1931–58; VIII, 261).
Cf. note 18 supra.
See, for example, Grave (1960, ch.5) and Rollin (1978, pp. 257–70).
I, VI, xxi, (Works, p. 188); I, VI, xxiv (Works, pp. 194, 196, 199).
I, VI, xx (Works, pp. 183, 209); IP, I, ii (Works, p. 231); II, v (Works, pp. 258–60); VI, v (Works, p. 445). This is what Peirce calls the category of secondness. Cf. Peirce (1931–58; VII, 643; VII, 635, VII, 619; IV, 57; III, 361 et al.).
I, II, v (Works, p. 107); IP, VI, vi (Works, pp. 454–5).
I, VI, xxiv (Works, p. 198); IP, VI, v (Works, p. 443).
I, VI, xxiv (Works, pp. 196–7); IP, VI, iv (Works, p. 438); VI, v (Works, p. 450).
See ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1878) in Peirce (1931–58; V, 358–87) and especially 377–81. To these methods, Peirce opposes the only method which may now apply to the state of knowledge, the Scientific Method.
This is a very important theme in Peirce’s philosophy. Cf. Peirce (1931–58; V, 265, 319; VIII, 16 et al.).
I, II, vii (Works, p. 110); VI, xx (Works, p. 184).
Cf. note 6 supra. See also Griffin-Collard (1976, pp. 126–42).
This lies at the core of Reid’s discussion of universals, and especially on qualities. Are they in the mind, or in the body? Does a common name signify one or two things?
Consider, for example, the errors of interpretation we make about the natural language of signs, and confusions arising from a single name meaning different things.
‘Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man’, ‘Some consequences of four incapacities’, and ‘Grounds of validity of the Laws of Logic’ in Peirce (1931–58; V, 213–357).
Peirce (1931–58; V, 244–9). For a more extensive analysis of this theme, see Engel-Tiercelin (1982).
Peirce (1931–58; I, 19; V, 77n).
Cf. Peirce (1931–58; V, 508).
Peirce (1931–58; V, 523).
Peirce (1931–58; V, 511) alludes to the Darwinian themes which exercised a deep influence on him.
Fallibilism is a very important element in Peirce’s philosophy of science, as in his metaphysics. It is the doctrine that there always remains indeterminacy and vagueness, so that we can never be cocksure that today’s truth may not be falsified.
Griffin-Collard (1976, p. 141) concludes that Reid develops a ‘static’ theory of knowledge.
See, for example, I, V, iii (Works, p. 122); or IP, I, ii (Works, p. 234); or his discussion of analogy I, iv (Works, pp. 236–8); or his admission that Newton’s principle of gravitation may be wrong in so far as “it is not a necessary truth, whose contrary is impossible” (IP, VI, iv Works, p. 436).
IP, I, ii (Works, p. 233) and VI, viii (Works, pp. 468–75).
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Engel-Tiercelin, C. (1989). Reid and Peirce on Belief. In: Dalgarno, M., Matthews, E. (eds) The Philosophy of Thomas Reid. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2338-6_14
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