Abstract
Science is not an external aspect of rational cultures. On the long road from their highly praised discovery of the scientific mind by the Greeks, these cultures first learned to define their rationality primarily in terms of the concept of the scientific, and later also in terms of the technical. Rational cultures in this sense are technical cultures supported by science. As such they constitute the modern world.
I would like to thank Dr. Martin Carrier (Konstanz) for his assistance on numerous questions in the history of science and for giving the manuscript the benefit of his critical attention.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Met.A1.980a21.
For the methodology for this distinction see F. Kambartel, “Wie ist praktische Philosophie konstruktiv möglich? Über einige Mißverständnisse eines methodischen Verständnisses praktischer Diskurse”, in Praktische Philosophie und konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie, F. Kambartel (ed.), Frankfurt 1974, pp. 22ff.
For a more detailed account see J. Mittelstrass, “Theorie und Empirie der Wissenschaftsforschung”, in Grundlegung der historischen Wissenschaftsforschung, C. Burrichter (ed.), Basel/Stuttgart 1979, pp. 71–106.
Cf. Ch. Thiel, “Alchemie”, in Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, vol. I, J. Mittelstrass (ed.), Mannheim/Vienna/Zurich 1980, pp. 67–74.
The first sentence of an apocryphal text attributed to Hermes Trismegistos. See Ch. Thiel, “Makrokosmos”, in Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, vol. II, J. Mittelstrass (ed.), Mannheim/Vienna/Zurich 1984, p. 749.
J. J. Wagner, System der Idealphilosophie, Leipzig 1804, p. LIII.
R. Fludd, Utriusque cosmi majoris scilicet et minoris metaphysica, atque technical historia, vols. I–II, Oppenheim/Frankfurt 1617.
E. J. Dijksterhuis, De Mechanisering van het Wereldbeeld, Amsterdam 1950, p. 539.
See, for example, H. R. Post on the ‘inductive’ model in “Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In Praise of Conservative Induction”, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 2 (1971), pp. 213–255.
G. Wolters discusses this also with respect to overemphasized conceptions of discontinuity in “Topik der Forschung. Zur wissenschaftstheoretischen Funktion der Heuristik bei Ernst Mach” in Technische Rationalität und rationale Heuristik, C. Burrichter/R. Inhetveen/R. Kötter (eds.), Paderborn etc. 1986, pp. 123–154, here pp. 138f.
here pp. 138f.
On the use of this term in the philosophy of science see J. Mittelstrass, “Historismus in der neueren Wissenschaftstheorie”, in Die Bedeutung der Wissenschaftsgeschichte für die Wissenschaftstheorie (Symposium of the Leibniz Society in Hanover, Nov. 29th and 30th, 1974) Wiesbaden 1977 (Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 6), pp. 43–56.
See also my article “Historische Analyse und konstruktive Begründung”, in Konstruktionen versus Positionen. Beiträge zur Diskussion um die Konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie, vols. I–II, K. Lorenz (ed.), Berlin/New York 1978, vol. II (Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie), pp. 256–277.
M. Carrier, “Wissenschaftsgeschichte, rationale Rekonstruktion und die Begründung von Methodologien”, Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 17 (1986), p. 203.
On the concept of (rational) reconstruction and the difference between reconstruction and interpretation, see J. Mittelstrass, “Scientific Rationality and Its Reconstruction”, in Reason and Rationality in Natural Science. A Group of Essays, N. Rescher (ed.), Lanham/New York/London 1985, pp. 83–102, here pp. 89ff.
Carrier, op. cit., p. 202.
Ibid.
See here also Carrier, op. cit., p. 203.
On this distinction see K. Lorenz, “The Concept of Science. Some Remarks on the Methodological Issue ‘Construction’ versus ‘Description’ in the Philosophy of Science”, in the Transcendental Arguments and Science. Essays in Epistemology, P. Bieri/R. P. Horstmann/L. Krüger (eds.), Dordrecht/Boston/London 1979, pp. 177–190.
Th. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago 1970, p. 3.
For additional comments see J. Mittelstrass, “Rationale Rekonstruktion der Wissenschaftsgeschichte”, in Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsforschung, P. Janich (ed.), Munich 1981, pp. 89–111.
For additional comments see J. Mittelstrass, “Rationale Rekonstruktion der Wissenschaftsgeschichte”, in Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsforschung, P. Janich (ed.), Munich 1981, pp. 137–148.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mittelstrass, J. (1989). World Pictures: The World of the History and Philosophy of Science. In: Brown, J.R., Mittelstrass, J. (eds) An Intimate Relation. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 116. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2327-0_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2327-0_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7546-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2327-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive