Nyíri on the Conservatism of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy

Abstract

In his keynote address to the 2nd International Wittgenstein Symposium at Kirchberg am Wechsel in Lower Austria in 1977 G. H. von Wright announced the publication of Wittgenstein’s pensées on philosophy, culture and society from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and argued that the publication of the Vermischte Bemerkungen pressed the question of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s personal beliefs and his philosophical positions upon us more poignantly than even before.¹ Wittgenstein’s enthusiastic endorsement of Oswald Spengler’s Kulturpessimismus more than anything else made it imperative in Professor Wright’s view that we determine whether the connection between Wittgenstein’s personal and philosophical beliefs is merely historical and psychological, or logically and conceptually linked. I have long believed that there is unity between Wittgenstein’s life and his thought. Indeed, I have made this view the cornerstone of my researches into Wittgenstein’s intellectual and moral heritage. However, I have refrained from articulating the precise nature of this link for two reasons: on account of the paucity of reliable information about his life, on the one hand, and the remarkably difficult problem of establishing such logico-conceptual links between personal beliefs and philosophical positions, on the other.